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Against Orthodoxy:
Miranda is Not Prophylactic and the
Constitution is Not Perfect
Lawrence Rosenthal*
INTRODUCTION
In the four decades since the decision in Miranda v. Arizona,1 two points of consensus have emerged about that decision.
In the discussion that follows, I mean to take on both.
The first area of agreement is that Miranda’s rationale for
requiring its now-famous warnings is wrong, or at least dramatically overstated. In Miranda, the Court, applying to police interrogation the Fifth Amendment’s admonition that “[n]o person
shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,”2 concluded that “without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”3 That
view of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation,
however, did not survive.
In Michigan v. Tucker,4 the Court first labeled Miranda
warnings as “prophylactic standards.”5 By this the Court meant
that “Miranda warnings . . . are ‘not themselves rights protected
by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the
right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’”6 Ac* Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. I am immensely
grateful for the comments provided by Katherine Darmer, Steven Duke, Scott Howe, and
Yale Kamisar. Any errors that remain are my own despite their best efforts to set me
straight. Special thanks are due to Tom Bell and the Committee on Teaching, Evaluation
and Scholarship at Chapman University School of Law for arranging a workshop presentation of this article at which I received many valuable suggestions. My thanks also to
Andrew Bugman and Michael Riddell for highly capable research assistance.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 384 U.S. at 467.
4 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
5 Id. at 446. For a largely accurate prediction of the implications of Tucker, see
Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 115–
25.
6 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444
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cordingly, “[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule . . . sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.”7 Thus, the Court has
habitually characterized Miranda warnings as “prophylactic.”8
This is despite the fact that Miranda itself never characterized
its holding as prophylactic, and within three years of Miranda,
the Court expressly reaffirmed that decision and added that the
use of “admissions obtained in the absence of the required warnings was a flat violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the
Fifth Amendment as construed in Miranda.”9
This view of Miranda has had dramatic results. While it is
settled that under the Fifth Amendment, compelled statements
may not be used for any purpose—including impeachment of the
declarant’s subsequent testimony,10 or as a source of investigative leads11—Miranda’s prophylactic nature is thought to permit
the use of unwarned statements made during custodial interrogation for impeachment,12 as well as physical evidence or subsequent Mirandized confessions that are obtained as a consequence
of antecedent Miranda violations.13 The prophylactic characterization of Miranda has also led the Court to conclude that its requirements are inapplicable to contexts in which the costs of exclusion are deemed to be particularly high, such as when police
officers are facing an exigency that threatens public safety.14
(alterations in original)).
7 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
8 E.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638–41 (2004) (plurality opinion);
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–73 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.); Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1993);
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680–81
(1988); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528 (1987); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308; New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 491–92
(1981) (Powell, J., concurring in result). There is no small debate over the meaning of the
term “prophylactic” in this context. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years
Later: A Close Look at the Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 387, 411 n.147 (2001). For present purposes, it will suffice to utilize that term in the
sense that it has appeared in the Court’s post-Miranda decisions—a rule is “prophylactic”
if it grants relief without a finding that a litigant’s own constitutional rights have been
violated. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306–07. Perhaps the best explication of this meaning of prophylaxis has been offered by Brian Landsberg: “I use the term ‘prophylactic
rules’ to refer to those risk-avoidance rules that are not directly sanctioned or required by
the Constitution, but that are adopted to ensure that the government follows constitutionally sanctioned or required rules.” Brian K. Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional
Rights: The Uses and Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925, 926 (1999).
9 See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326 (1969).
10 See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 458–59 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 401–02 (1978).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 29–30, 38 (2000); Michigan v.
Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 351 (1990); Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
12 See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
13 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 639–44; id. at 644–45 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment); Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307–09.
14 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–58 (1984).
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Where this freewheeling cost-benefit analysis may lead in the future is anybody’s guess.
For their part, Miranda’s advocates do not spend much time
defending its conception of unwarned custodial interrogation as
inherently coercive.
Even Stephen Schulhofer, perhaps
Miranda’s most vigorous proponent, concedes that Miranda rests
on what he characterizes as a “conclusive presumption” that custodial interrogation involves compulsion within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment.15 Instead, Miranda’s defenders argue for
the propriety of prophylactic constitutional law,16 despite vigorous protests from Miranda opponents.17 David Strauss, for example, defends prophylactic constitutional law by arguing that
when there is a sufficiently high risk of a constitutional violation,
the Court has frequently concluded that a prophylactic rule is
warranted.18 To demonstrate that Miranda is no innovation in
constitutional law, he likens Miranda to what he characterizes as
a prophylactic rule of First Amendment law forbidding discrimination on the basis of content when regulating speech or other
expressive activities because of the risk that content regulation
will be motivated by a censorial hostility to disfavored ideas.19
Professor Strauss’s analogy to First Amendment jurisprudence is contestable. It is unclear whether the First Amendment
rules on which Professor Strauss relies are properly characterized as “prophylactic”; perhaps they are more fairly characterized

15 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 446–53
(1987). If there is any more vigorous Miranda advocate than Schulhofer, it is Yale
Kamisar, who has endorsed this position as well. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress
“Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 943–50 (2000).
16 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1,
114–66 (2004); Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (2001); David Huitema, Miranda: Legitimate Response to Contingent Requirements of the Fifth Amendment, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 280–89 (2000); Yale
Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 465,
471–76 (1999); Kamisar, supra note 8, at 410–25; Susan R. Klein, Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Self-Incrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act Collide, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 417, 481–88 (1994); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
109, 181–88 (1998).
17 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457–61 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100 (1985). These attacks have not left Miranda’s
supporters unmoved; George Thomas, for example, so despairs of any justification for
Miranda as a prophylactic rule of Fifth Amendment law that he has come to advocate for
Miranda as a due process requirement instead. See George C. Thomas III, Separated at
Birth But Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1081, 1093–117 (2001).
18 See Strauss, supra note 16, at 192–95; David A. Strauss, Miranda, the Constitution, and Congress, 99 MICH. L. REV. 958, 966–68 (2001).
19 See Strauss, supra note 16, at 195–204; Strauss, supra note 18, at 963–65.
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as “bright-line” rules selected for ease of administration.20 It is
equally unclear that strict scrutiny of laws that regulate the content of speech is fairly characterized as prophylactic because such
laws can be invalidated without proof of a censorial motive; after
all, the First Amendment forbids all laws “abridging the freedom
of speech,”21 not merely “censorship.” It may be that all inadequately justified restrictions on speech should be deemed to violate the First Amendment regardless of the presence of a censorial motive, whether likely or actual; the principal significance of
content regulation is that it demonstrates that the government’s
justification for a regulation is suspect when it is not applied uniformly.22 Even if Professor Strauss is right to characterize the
First Amendment skepticism about content discrimination as
prophylactic, the Court has consistently applied the rule against
content discrimination whenever an unacceptable censorial risk
is thought to be present.23 When it comes to Miranda, however,
20 For a quite helpful effort to explicate the difference between prophylactic and
bright-line rules, see Landsberg, supra note 8, at 950–51.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
22 In City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994), for example, the Court observed that
“[e]xemptions from an otherwise legitimate regulation of a medium of speech may be
noteworthy for a reason quite apart from the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: They may diminish the credibility of the government’s rationale for restricting
speech in the first place.” Id. at 52. Indeed, in what was probably the high-water mark of
the Court’s suspicion of content regulation, Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92
(1972), the Court applied the rule against content discrimination to invalidate a prohibition on picketing near schools that exempted labor picketing, see id. at 99–102, yet surely
no one thought that Chicago was attempting to censor all views except those of teachers’
unions. Instead, the exemption was used to undermine Chicago’s proffered justification
for the regulation on the ground that “Chicago itself has determined that peaceful labor
picketing during school hours is not an undue interference with school.” Id. at 100. On
the question whether the First Amendment is properly understood as prohibiting only
censorial motives, compare, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of
Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996) (identifying censorial motive as the linchpin for First Amendment analysis), and Jed Rubenfeld,
The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001) (same), with John Fee,
Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103 (2005) (rejecting motive as dispositive),
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54
STAN. L. REV. 737 (2002) (same), and Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005) (same). Although in Dickerson, the parties defending Miranda took Professor Strauss’s view that many rules of constitutional
law are properly understood as prophylactic, the Court refrained from endorsing that position, and Justice Scalia’s dissent argued that of all the assertedly prophylactic rules
pressed on the Court, only the rule that an increased sentence imposed after a successful
appeal should be deemed vindictive and hence violative of due process could properly be
characterized as prophylactic, and for that reason was an anomaly. See Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457–61 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even this concession
may be too generous; the presumption of vindictiveness upon resentencing may simply
define what constitutes adequate proof of a vindictive motive rather than prophylaxis as
that concept was used in Miranda. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798–801
(1989). For a contrary argument that the doctrines pressed upon in Dickerson are properly characterized as prophylactic, see Kamisar, supra note 8, at 410–25.
23 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387–90 (1992).
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the Court has been willing to limit its reach and remedial force
even in circumstances that it acknowledges contain the very risk
of coercive interrogation that gave rise to the Miranda rule.24 No
arguably prophylactic First Amendment doctrine has been circumscribed in a similar way.25
Moreover, even assuming the prevalence of prophylactic
rules of constitutional law, in the particular world of Fifth
Amendment prophylaxis, Miranda is unique. Prophylactic Fifth
Amendment rules are not unknown; for example, even though
the Fifth Amendment, by its terms, prohibits only compelling a
“witness” to testify in a “criminal case,”26 a seemingly prophylactic Fifth Amendment rule requires that even those asked to testify in noncriminal proceedings, who fear that their statements
could later be used to incriminate them, must be given immunity
to ensure that there is no later use of that testimony in a criminal case.27 When testimony is immunized in this fashion, however, the Fifth Amendment is thought to require that it not be
used for any purpose in a subsequent criminal case.28 In contrast, Miranda, as we have seen, does not carry a prohibition of
the use of unwarned statements for impeachment or investigative leads.29 Thus, the label “prophylactic” has made Miranda a
particularly lame constitutional duck.

See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655–57 (1984).
Professor Strauss argues that the limitations on the scope of Miranda are no different than the limitations that the Court has placed on First Amendment doctrines, noting, as an example, that “the constitutional rules governing defamation of public officials
are different from the rules governing defamation of private individuals, which are in
turn different from the rules governing defamation that addresses no subject of public interest.” Strauss, supra note 18, at 968. But the threat that defamation liability will stifle
public discussion and debate is thought to be particularly great when the allegedly defamatory statement concerns a public official or a matter of public concern. See, e.g.,
R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 421 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1990); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767,
771–75 (1986); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–61
(1985) (plurality opinion). Thus, as with First Amendment content discrimination doctrine that limits strict scrutiny to circumstances in which the threat to First Amendment
values is thought to be high, see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387–90, the Court has also granted
enhanced First Amendment protection against defamation liability only in circumstances
in which the threat to First Amendment values posed by potential defamation liability is
thought to be high. In the Miranda context, in contrast, as noted above, even when the
precise danger that gave rise to Miranda is present—the coercive pressures of custodial
interrogation—the Court has nevertheless limited both the scope and the remedial efficacy of Miranda.
26 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004) (plurality opinion); Chavez
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770–73 (2003) (plurality opinion); id. at 777–78 (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
28 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804–06 (1977); Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 84–85 (1973).
29 See supra text accompanying notes 12–13.
24
25
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The second point of agreement is that Miranda has turned
out to be a failure combating the coercive nature of custodial interrogation.30 Despite Miranda, coerced confessions are said to
be ubiquitous.31 Thus, we are told that stronger medicine is
needed, such as videotaping custodial interrogation,32 requiring
counsel during interrogation,33 strengthening constitutional
regulation of the admissibility of confessions,34 forbidding interrogation techniques thought to be particularly likely to produce
false or coercive confessions,35 or abolishing custodial interrogation entirely.36
30 See, e.g., WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE
INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 139–86 (2001); Louis Michael Seidman,
Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 740, 745–46 (1992); William J. Stuntz,
Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975 (2001); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police Interrogation Room, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091 (2003); Welsh
S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1211 (2001).
31 See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions,
in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36, 44–47 (Saundra D.
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, app. B, tbls.1–2
& 5–8 (1987); Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901–62 (2004); Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations
in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 544–46
(2005); Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 512–520; Richard A. Leo
& Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and
Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
32 See, e.g., YALE KAMISAR, Brewer v. Williams—A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 113, 132–
37 (1980); WHITE, supra note 30, at 190–95; Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957, 977–78 (1997); Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An
Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 486–97 (1996); Daniel Donovan & John
Rhodes, Comes a Time: The Case for Recording Interrogations, 61 MONT. L. REV. 223
(2000); Drizin & Leo, supra note 31, at 966–1001; Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the
Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV.
781, 808–09, 815 (2006); Leo, supra note 31, at 49–50; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 681–92 (1996); Richard A. Rosen,
Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 261–66; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda,
Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 941, 955 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309
(2003); Stuntz, supra note 30, at 981; Wayne T. Westling, Something Is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let’s Try Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537 (2001).
33 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987); Schulhofer, supra note 32, at
955.
34 See, e.g., KAMISAR, Kauper’s “Judicial Examination of the Accused” Forty Years
Later—Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 32, at 77; Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions—
Lessons of the Central Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 231–52
(2006); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational
Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 1115–22 (1997); Stuntz, supra note
30, at 995–98.
35 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 30, at 196–215; Alschuler, supra note 32, at 967–78;
Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the
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My task will be to demonstrate that both points of consensus
are wrong. On the first, I will argue that Miranda was quite
right to conclude that custodial interrogation inherently involves
compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Thus,
Miranda is not prophylactic—its warnings are required only
when a suspect is compelled to incriminate himself, and they ensure that incriminating statements are received in evidence only
when a suspect has validly waived the right to be free from compelled self-incrimination. On the second, I will argue that
Miranda should be measured by whether it has produced greater
compliance with the Fifth Amendment, and on that score,
Miranda is a resounding success. Miranda’s required warnings
succeed in producing valid waivers of Fifth Amendment rights,
and therefore prevent what would otherwise be unconstitutional
interrogations. Although suspects may frequently misgauge
their own interests in deciding whether to submit to custodial interrogation, the Fifth Amendment does not protect suspects from
themselves—it is not aimed at “[p]reventing foolish (rather than
compelled) confessions,” to use Justice Scalia’s typically memorable formulation.37 Perhaps Miranda is a failure from the standpoint of those who think that the Constitution condemns any tactic that might smack of overreaching or risk convicting the
innocent, but the Constitution does not demand perfection. The
Fifth Amendment, in particular, prohibits only compulsion; and
once a suspect validly waives his right to be free from compelled
self-incrimination, the Fifth Amendment does not protect a suspect from his own improvident decision to submit to interrogation. As for the Due Process Clause, although it is hardly indifferent to the risk of wrongful conviction, it surely does not
demand that the risk of error in criminal litigation be zero—a
risk of error inheres in virtually any investigative tactic, from
eyewitness testimony to fingerprints. For the most part, however, the critics of police interrogation as currently practiced
cannot demonstrate that the tactics that they would forbid under
the rubric of due process pose any greater risk of convicting the
innocent than any others. We are far from the day when an emLegality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 (2006); Mark
A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 465, 515–39 (2005); Alan Hirsch,
Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 HOW. L.J. 31, 54–59
(2005); Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 425 (1996).
36 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 723–28 (1988); Irene
Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of Custodial
Confessions, 68 N.C. L. REV. 69, 109–14 (1989).
37 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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pirical case can be made that interrogation tactics that are considered appropriate under current law should be condemned because they create what is thought to be an undue risk of error—a
truly prophylactic approach to constitutional criminal procedure.
In short, for constitutional purposes, a confession obtained after
a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights is good enough.
I. MIRANDA IS NOT PROPHYLACTIC: A CONSTITUTIONAL
DEFENSE OF MIRANDA
The Supreme Court’s first encounter with the intersection of
the Fifth Amendment and custodial interrogation was Bram v.
United States.38 That case involved the interrogation of Bram,
the first officer on an American ship, who was suspected of murdering the ship’s captain, the captain’s wife, and the second
mate.39 After Charles Brown, who was at the ship’s wheel on the
night of the murders, told his shipmates that he had seen Bram
murder the captain, Bram was put in irons and subsequently
placed in police custody when the ship reached Halifax.40 In
Halifax, Bram was brought before a police detective, who
stripped Bram of his clothing, which he then searched.41 At that
point, the detective later testified that he told Bram:
“Bram, we are trying to unravel this horrible mystery.” I said: “Your
position is rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office
and he made a statement that he saw you do the murder.” He said:
“He could not have seen me; where was he?” I said: “He states he was
at the wheel.” “Well,” he said, “he could not see me from there.” I
said: “Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the captain
from all I have heard from Mr. Brown. But,” I said, “some of us here
think you could not have done all that crime alone. If you had an accomplice, you should say so, and not have the blame of this horrible
crime on your own shoulders.” He said: “Well, I think, and many others on board the ship think, that Brown is the murderer; but I don’t
know anything about it.”42

This testimony was subsequently offered and received at
Bram’s trial as a false effort at exculpation reflecting Bram’s consciousness of guilt.43
If Bram’s interrogation sounds familiar, it should. The tactics in play in Bram are not dissimilar to the police tactics considered in Miranda itself. The police manuals that the Court famously reviewed essentially advised interrogators to induce
38
39
40
41
42
43

168 U.S. 532 (1897).
Id. at 534–37.
Id. at 535–37.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 541–42.
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suspects to believe that it was in the suspect’s interest to confess
by minimizing or excusing the suspect’s conduct, leading him to
believe that his conviction is a certainty, or assuring him that his
cooperation will be rewarded.44 Even after Miranda, these tactics continue to be used; while the requisite warnings are now
given, interrogators still try to convince suspects that they will be
better off if they confess.45
This was certainly the approach that I took when I participated in interrogations during my years as a prosecutor, usually
in an effort to “flip” a potential cooperator upon arrest. I never
met a suspect who was eager to confess—the suspects I encountered uniformly wished to stay out of jail. In my experience, suspects cooperated with interrogation only if they perceived it to be
in their interest to do so. So before beginning an interrogation, I
would make a few “let-me-tell-you-why-I’m-here” remarks, which
I carefully prefaced with an admonition that I wanted the suspect not to respond so as to avoid engaging in unwarned custodial
interrogation.46 In those remarks, I would convey to the suspect
that he was in a lot of trouble, characterizing things in as dire a
fashion as a plausible view of the evidence would allow. Then, I
would give the requisite warnings, and if I obtained a waiver, I
would stress my ability to help the suspect if he cooperated.
Thus, I tried to use the threat of sanctions to induce cooperation,
just as the manuals instruct.
The question posed by Bram—and by my own interrogations—is whether an implicit threat to send someone to prison for
as long as possible unless he agrees to submit to interrogation is
a form of compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. To me, this has never seemed like a very hard question;
nor did the Court see it as particularly difficult in Bram. In that
case, the Court concluded that Bram’s statements were inadmissible because they “must necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the mind.”47 The Court
explained:
It cannot be doubted that . . . the result was to produce upon [Bram’]s

44 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 449–55 (1966). See also, e.g., KAMISAR, What Is
an “Involuntary” Confession?, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, supra note
32, at 1; WHITE, supra note 30, at 25–36.
45 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 30, at 76–101; Leo, supra note 31, at 39–41; Richard
A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 259 (1996); Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’ Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397,
431–50 (1999).
See also FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS 232–80 (4th ed. 2001).
46 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–02 (1980).
47 Bram, 168 U.S. at 562 (emphasis added).
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mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an
admission of guilt . . . and it cannot be conceived that the converse
impression would not also have naturally arisen, that by denying
there was hope of removing suspicion from himself.48

There are those who believe that the Fifth Amendment’s
prohibition on compelled self-incrimination was intended to do no
more than codify the common law privilege against compelled
oaths.49 On this view, Bram went wrong in extending the Fifth
Amendment to unsworn interrogation and improperly conflating
the privilege against compelled self-incriminatory testimony with
the common law rule that forbade the reception of an involuntary
confession in evidence.50 But once one agrees that the Fifth
Amendment extends to admitting the results of an unsworn interrogation into evidence at a subsequent trial, on the ground
that the declarant who was under compulsion to confess becomes
a “witness” within the meaning the Fifth Amendment,51 it is hard
to argue with the concept of compulsion embraced in Bram.
The appropriate starting point, of course, is to define compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. There is general
Id.
See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 70–88 (1997); JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 123–43
(1993); 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 823 (Aspen Law
& Business 1970) (1904); William T. Pizzi & Morris B. Hoffman, Taking Miranda’s Pulse,
58 VAND. L. REV. 813, 842–44 (2005).
50 See, e.g., Godsey, supra note 35, at 477–88. Other commentators, however, argue
that the Fifth Amendment incorporated elements of both the privilege and the evidentiary
rule. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 325–32, 405–32 (1968); Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for
Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67
WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 92–109 (1989); Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The Recharacterization of the Right against Self-Incrimination as a
“Trial Right” in Chavez v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987 (2003); Lawrence Herman, The
Unexplored Relationship between the Privilege against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and
the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 497, 529–50 (1992); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Miranda v. Arizona Revisited: Constitutional Law or Judicial Fiat, 26
WASHBURN L.J. 1, 4–8 (1986).
51 Even before Bram, the Court had taken this position in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 634–35 (1886). For arguments in support of this conclusion, see, e.g., KAMISAR,
Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Procedure (1965), in POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, supra note 32, at 27 [hereinafter KAMISAR, Equal Justice]; KAMISAR, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the “New” Fifth
Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test (1966), in POLICE INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS, supra note 32, at 41, 41–68 [hereinafter KAMISAR, A Dissent]; Albert W.
Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2667–72 (1996); Herman, supra note 50, at 529–50. Indeed, even
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, the two Miranda foes now sitting on the Court, see
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 461–65 (2000) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
dissenting), have concluded that the term “witness,” at least within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment, includes not only one who gives testimony but also anyone who furnishes evidence to the prosecution that it later uses at trial. See United States v. Hubbell,
530 U.S. 27, 49–56 (2000) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
48
49
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agreement that the paradigmatic form of compulsion that was
forbidden by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination as
it was understood at the time of the Fifth Amendment’s ratification was the compelled oath.52 An accused who declined to take
the oath risked conviction, contempt, or other sanctions.53 The
original meaning of compulsion, then, is the use of a threat of
criminal sanctions to obtain testimony. Indeed, the most natural
reading of the term “compulsion” is the threat of adverse consequences—such as the historically paradigmatic sanction of conviction or contempt—as a form of coercive pressure on a suspect
to become a “witness” against himself.54 The textual prohibition
on compelled self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, however, is not limited to those who are compelled to take oaths, nor
to those subjected to torture or other specified techniques for eliciting confessions. In particular, unlike the Sixth Amendment’s
Compulsory Process Clause, which addresses only the compulsion that inheres in requiring a witness to testify at a trial,55 the
Fifth Amendment is triggered by any form of compulsion, not
merely the obligation to obey compulsory process requiring one to
appear and testify at a judicial proceeding. This suggests that
the holding in Bram was correct; Bram was subjected to compulsion—the threat of criminal sanctions—during his interrogation,
and that threat was used to induce him to submit to interrogation.
To be sure, the threat of conviction or contempt for a refusal
to take a mandatory oath is a more direct form of compulsion
than the future risk of sanctions facing Bram, but again, the
Fifth Amendment’s text prohibits any quantum or form of compulsion, not just compulsion through direct, immediate, and relatively certain sanctions to be imposed in an already pending proceeding. As the Court wrote in Bram,
A confession can never be received in evidence where the prisoner has
been influenced by any threat or promise; for the law cannot measure
the force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind

52 See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 49, at 124–31; LEVY, supra note 50, at 205–404; Godsey, supra note 35, at 477–85; John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1072–85 (1994); Eben
Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Origins of the Constitutional Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1086 (1994).
53 See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 50, at 130–33, 269; Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored
Relationship Between the Privilege Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part I), 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 108, 134–35 (1992); Langbein, supra note 52, at 1073.
54 Mark Godsey, although a critic of Bram, provides a particularly helpful account in
support of just this view of compulsion. See Godsey, supra note 35, at 491–97.
55 “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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of the prisoner, and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of
influence has been exerted.56

It was through the threat of a prosecution for murder that Bram
was induced to accuse Brown while denying that Brown could
have seen him, and that is compulsion in the same sense that
persons were once compelled to testify under oath by the threat
of contempt. As the Court observed, Bram could not have decided whether to respond to the detective’s queries without necessarily considering the peril he faced. Similarly, when I succeeded in obtaining cooperation from my interrogees, they
necessarily had to consider the magnitude of sanctions that they
faced if they failed to cooperate. Thus, whatever else might
amount to compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, Bram correctly concluded that threatening a suspect with
criminal sanctions during custodial interrogation falls within the
scope of the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled selfincrimination.57
At the outset, I promised to defend the proposition that custodial interrogation always involves compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Even if I am right that Bram’s interrogation, or my own, involved Fifth Amendment compulsion,
that does not mean that every instance of custodial interrogation
56 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897) (quoting 3 SIR WM. OLDNALL
RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval
Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896)). For a fascinating discussion of the evolution of the rule against
promises of leniency during interrogation between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries and how it led some jurisdictions to a solution much like Miranda, see Wesley
MacNeil Oliver, Magistrates’ Examinations, Police Interrogations, and Miranda-Like
Warnings in the Nineteenth Century, 81 TUL. L. REV. 777, 786-810 (2007).
57 The Supreme Court has occasionally, and without citing historical evidence, characterized torture as the chief evil against which the right against compelled selfincrimination was directed. See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002). Although
the historical basis for this focus on torture as opposed to compulsory oaths is questionable, even under the Court’s own precedents, see, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442-43, treating torture as the paradigm of compulsion does not blunt the force of the argument advanced above. Torture, like the sanctions that following from refusing to take a
compulsory oath, was a form of punishment that followed from a refusal to cooperate with
interrogation. The text of the Fifth Amendment, moreover, does not identify only a single
form of compulsion that is forbidden. Instead, any form of compulsion—be it torture or
any other type of punitive sanction based on a refusal to submit to interrogation—renders
a subsequent statement inadmissible. That said, it is beyond the scope of the current project to attempt a comprehensive account of Fifth Amendment compulsion. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to observe that the original meaning of the text supports Bram’s
view that a threat of a criminal prosecution amounts to compulsion, whatever else might
also constitute compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. For a more extended
discussion of what types of adverse governmental actions might amount to compulsion
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, see, for example, GRANO, supra note 49, at
59–83; Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-Incrimination Clause Explained and
Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 243, 250–56 (2004); Godsey, supra
note 35, at 491–97; Peter Westen & Stuart Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The
Emerging Fifth Amendment Doctrine of “Preferred Response,” 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 521,
535–40 (1982).
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involves compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Of course, once Bram had established that the law cannot
endeavor to measure the effect of compulsion on the mind of a
prisoner, it was perhaps only a small step to Miranda’s holding
that custodial interrogation inherently involves compulsion, but
it is surely possible to argue that custodial interrogation sometimes occurs in the absence of anything fairly characterized as
compulsion. In his dissenting opinion in Miranda, Justice White
made the point this way: “[U]nder the Court’s rule, if the police
ask [an arrestee] a single question such as ‘Do you have anything
to say?’ or ‘Did you kill your wife?’ his response, if there is one,
has somehow been compelled . . . . Common sense informs us to
the contrary.”58 Most commentators seem to find this point unanswerable.59 But when a public official, with a badge and a gun,
deprives a suspect of his liberty, places him in custody, and then
asks, “do you have anything to say?” is it really the case that
there is no compulsion to respond?
One thing that is unquestionably inherent in custodial interrogation is an assertion of the state’s power to deprive suspects of
their liberty. When the state exercises this power, and then begins to interrogate the detainee, compulsion to respond to the interrogation is an inevitable result. After all, implicit in custodial
interrogation is the threat that the detention and accompanying
interrogation will be followed by a criminal prosecution with its
attendant sanctions. That kind of threat, in turn, is the hallmark of Fifth Amendment compulsion, as we have seen. Of
course, some detainees will have the fortitude to ignore their
jailer’s questions, but if the interrogator’s questions go unanswered, there has been no Fifth Amendment violation because
the suspect has not been compelled to become a witness against
himself.60 When the suspect submits to interrogation, however,
384 U.S. at 533–34 (White, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., GRANO, supra note 49, at 59–83; Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1446–58 (1985); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 839, 919 (1996); George C. Thomas III, An Assault on the Temple of Miranda, 85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 807, 818–22 (1995) (reviewing JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS,
TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993)); Anthony P. Bigornia, Supreme Court Review, The Supreme
Court’s Cost-Benefit Analysis of Federal Habeas Review of Alleged Miranda Violations, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 915, 934–35 (1994). See also Schulhofer, supra note 15, at
448.
60 In this respect, it bears remembering that Miranda does not prohibit unwarned
interrogation per se, it only addresses the admission of evidence derived from the unwarned interrogation in a subsequent criminal case. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.
760, 770–73 (2003) (plurality opinion); id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). See also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Indeed, in Miranda itself, the Court framed its holding in terms of the admissibility of
evidence: “[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
58
59
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at least absent extraordinary circumstances, I see no plausible
way to deny that the suspect has been compelled to respond to
his captor’s questions within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment by virtue of the compulsive power of custody and the inherent threat that it will continue unless the jailer is somehow satisfied. As Bram recognizes, the hope of pleasing one’s jailer—
convincing him that he is holding an innocent person, or at least
to be lenient—cannot help but enter into the calculations of one
subjected to custodial interrogation. Conversely, the threat that
the jailer, if unsatisfied by the suspect, will ultimately seek
criminal sanctions is equally implicit in any assertion of the
state’s power to detain and interrogate.61
To be sure, one can imagine bizarre cases in which the use of
custodial interrogation bears no causal relation to an ensuing
confession, such as a suspect who suffers under some form of
mental illness that produces a desire for confession or who otherwise decides to confess before he is taken into custody. It may
be that in an appropriate case, the Court will carve out such
cases from Miranda. The Court has already characterized
Miranda’s holding as establishing a “presumption of coercion”
“inherent in custodial interrogations,”62 perhaps it will eventually hold that this presumption can be rebutted by proof that
there was no causal relationship between an incriminating
statement and custodial interrogation.63 But surely the potential
for bizarre outliers in which there is no relationship between cusprocedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 384
U.S. at 444. Thus, if an officer engages in unwarned interrogation and is ignored, there
may be no compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, but there is no
Miranda violation either.
61 For an example of a suspect who seems to have suffered from a form of mental illness that instilled a desire to confess even before he was taken into custody, see Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 161–62 (1986).
62 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (plurality opinion); id. at 646
(Souter, J., dissenting); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988); Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985).
63 Indeed, the Court has already held that there are some situations that involve
technical custody but in which questioning is so routine and noncoercive that no compulsion in the constitutional sense is present. Thus, the Court has held that questioning during a routine traffic stop does not trigger Miranda, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 435–41 (1984), and that routine booking questions also fail to trigger Miranda, see
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601–02 (1990). Indeed, even the officer’s question
about the location of the suspect’s gun upon apprehending a suspect in the just-completed
armed rape at issue in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651–52, may not involve Fifth
Amendment compulsion; the events unfolded so quickly and spontaneously that the suspect may well not have been subject to the kind of compulsion that is present when a suspect must necessarily contemplate the risks inhering in remaining silent while under interrogation. See id. at 655–58. Given the Court’s willingness to limit the scope of
Miranda to contexts in which its presumption of compulsion holds, it is likely that
Miranda will not reach cases in which the suspect confesses for reasons unrelated to the
existence of custodial interrogation.
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todial interrogation and an ensuing confession is no reason to
doubt that absent extraordinary circumstances, the existence of
the custodial relation between interrogator and interrogee exerts
compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. If the
worst that can be said of Miranda is that it envisions the usual
case rather than the bizarre outlier, then it should be thought to
fare pretty well in the canon of constitutional criminal procedure.
It is doubtless true that Justice White’s hypothetical interrogation involves only a bit of compulsion—far less than the compulsion that inheres in physical punishment64 or the other tactics
considered impermissible when the Court was assessing confessions under the Due Process Clause’s “voluntariness” test.65
Once the Court left the vagaries of due process behind and held
that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelled selfincrimination was applicable to the states,66 however, the pertinent constitutional question, even as applied to state prosecutions, was whether compulsion was used to obtain an incriminating statement. And, as we have seen, the Fifth Amendment
forbids the admission of any confession obtained through compulsion, whether a little or a lot, as the Court held in Bram.
Thus, Miranda’s holding on the coercive nature of custodial interrogation is not only defensible, it was not even much of an innovation in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.67
Accordingly, there is little if any prophylaxis in the view that
compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment is inherent in the process of custodial interrogation. Indeed, that view
See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (inducing confession by threats
that defendant would lose custody of her children); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958) (holding suspect three days incommunicado with little food and threats of lynching); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (obtaining confessions after questioning ill defendant repeatedly over three days and using hypnosis to suggest guilt); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49 (1949) (questioning suspect repeatedly and persistently over six days); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (stripping suspect naked for three hours and then
questioning; questioning continued over three days during which defendant was held incommunicado); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (questioning repeatedly as suspect
was moved from jail to jail over a three-day period and told of threats of lynching); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (interrogating repeatedly over five days culminating
in an all-night session). For discussions of the relative breadth of the due-process concept
of voluntariness as compared to the Fifth Amendment’s concept of compulsion, see Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195 (1996); Steven Penney,
Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 309 (1998).
66 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
67 Indeed, in Miranda itself, the Court observed that the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment to custodial interrogation “could have been taken as settled in federal courts
almost 70 years ago [in Bram].” 384 U.S. at 461. To be sure, Bram had been rarely invoked by the Court prior to Miranda, but the Court decided only a single case involving
the application of the Fifth Amendment to custodial interrogation between Bram and
Miranda, and in that case, it treated Bram as controlling. See Ziang Sung Wan v. United
States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
64
65
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was not invented in Miranda; in fact the Court’s principal preMiranda advocate of unwarned interrogation, Justice Jackson,
took nearly that position more than two decades before Miranda.
Dissenting in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,68 Justice Jackson objected to
the majority’s concern with coercion in its analysis of the admissibility of a confession under the Due Process Clause because, in
his view, coercion was always present in custodial interrogation:
The Court bases its decision on the premise that custody and examination of a prisoner for thirty-six hours is ‘inherently coercive.’ Of
course it is. And so is custody and examination for one hour. Arrest
itself is inherently coercive, and so is detention. When not justified,
infliction of such indignities upon the person is actionable as a tort.
Of course such acts put pressure upon the prisoner to answer questions[,] to answer them truthfully, and to confess if guilty.69

The careful reader will note that Justice Jackson used the term
“coercive,” a concept that the Court had applied in its due process
jurisprudence concerning the admissibility of confessions in state
prosecutions before it held the Fifth Amendment applicable to
the states, rather than the Fifth Amendment concept of compulsion. Still, it was but a small step from his acknowledgement
that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive to Miranda’s
conclusion that custodial interrogation involved compulsion as
that concept is understood under the Fifth Amendment.70
The account of Fifth Amendment compulsion that I have advanced is rejected by nearly all commentators, but for strikingly
unpersuasive reasons. Albert Alschuler, for example, has written
that “[a] person can influence another’s choice without compelling it; to do so she need only keep her persuasion within appropriate bounds of civility . . . .”71 Perhaps so, but the “appropriate
bounds of civility” surely does not include imprisoning the object
of one’s attempts at persuasion; as Justice Jackson acknowledged, that form of “persuasion” goes into the realm of the tor-

322 U.S. 143 (1944).
Id. at 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting). In a similar vein, Joseph Grano argued that
one cannot assess the impact of any interrogation tactic without developing normative
standards to define what tactics should be deemed permissible. See GRANO, supra note
49, at 59–83.
70 For an account of the meaning of compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, see supra text accompanying notes 52–55. The term “coercion,” as it came to be used in the due
process cases, had no especially precise meaning. It appeared to denote methods involving a degree of psychological or physical pressure on a suspect that gave rise to an unacceptable risk of a false confession, or methods that were inconsistent with normative
standards that the Court was prepared to impose governing the amount of pressure that
interrogators would be permitted to utilize. See Penney, supra note 65, at 341–46. Whatever its precise meaning, this due-process concept of coercion is plainly not far from the
Fifth Amendment’s conception of compulsion. See Hancock, supra note 65, at 2223–32.
71 Alschuler, supra note 51, at 2626.
68
69
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tious.72 Mere persuasion, under Bram or in ordinary parlance, is
unaccompanied by actual or threatened deprivation of liberty.
Commentators also argue that Miranda’s concept of compulsion and waiver is inconsistent; they argue that if the threat of
criminal sanctions were deemed compulsion, a defendant could
never validly waive his Fifth Amendment rights because a
waiver given while a suspect is subject to compulsion could never
be voluntary.73 But that does not follow.
Miranda applied settled principles of waiver as it held that
to introduce the results of custodial interrogation into evidence,
“a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed
counsel,” adding that “[t]his Court has always set high standards
of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights.”74 The standards
for waiver, however, do not require that the defendant face no
risks if he chooses to assert his rights. We know this from the
guilty-plea cases, which characterize a plea of guilty as a waiver,
among other things, of the right against compelled selfincrimination,75 but add that an accused can nevertheless make a
72 See supra text accompanying note 69. Professor Grano, in contrast, argued that
noncustodial interrogation frequently involves tactics every bit as compulsive as custodial
interrogation. See Joseph D. Grano, Miranda’s Constitutional Difficulties: A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 174, 186 (1988). For noncustodial interrogation,
however, there is force to Professor Alschuler’s claim that the police are undertaking what
is properly characterized as persuasion as opposed to compulsion. In any event, even if
Miranda can fairly be accused of under-enforcing the Fifth Amendment by limiting its
holding to custodial interrogation, that accusation hardly undermines the thesis that
Miranda is not prophylactic.
73 See, e.g., DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS,
DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81, 119–20
(2003); Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator
and Modern Confessions Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 671–72 (1986) (reviewing FRED E.
INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (1986)); Seidman, supra note
30, at 740, 744; Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 (1986). Similarly, Professor Thomas argues that Fifth Amendment
compulsion cannot include the threat of conviction or the Fifth Amendment would prevent
a defendant from testifying at trial in his own defense in order to avoid conviction because
such testimony is necessarily compelled. See Thomas, supra note 59, at 820–21. These
arguments echo Justice White’s Miranda dissent:
But if the defendant may not answer without a warning a question such as
“Where were you last night?” without having his answer be a compelled one,
how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of whether
he wants to consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the Court will appoint?
384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting).
74 384 U.S. at 475.
75 See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187–88 (2004); United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622, 628–29 (2002); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 364 (1996); Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 397 n.7 (1993); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1992). This rule
emerged in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), in which the Court held that because
a guilty plea involves a waiver of constitutional rights, including the right against com-
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knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to seek the advantages of a negotiated disposition despite the pressure created by
a potentially greater sentence if the accused asserts the right to
trial.76 Indeed, even if a plea bargain ultimately turns out to be a
poor deal, the waiver is still considered valid.77 Similarly, when a
defendant elects to waive his right to remain silent and testify at
trial, he does so under the threat that the prosecution’s case, if
left unrebutted, will likely result in conviction. This kind of
pressure has also never been thought to amount to a violation of
the Fifth Amendment. Rather, “it is not thought inconsistent
with the enlightened administration of criminal justice to require
the defendant to weigh such pros and cons in deciding whether to
testify.”78 Similarly, a suspect asked to waive his right to remain
silent during custodial interrogation may decide to do so even
though he faces the threat of a criminal prosecution.
It follows that Miranda warnings provide the ingredients for
a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights; in this sense as well,
Miranda worked no innovation, but merely applied settled law.
Long before Miranda, it had been settled that “‘courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental
constitutional rights and . . . ‘do not presume acquiescence in the
loss of fundamental rights.’”79 It had been equally settled that a
valid waiver is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege.”80 Miranda applied these rules as it
fashioned its warnings in order to guarantee that suspects receive the information necessary to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of Fifth Amendment rights.81
pelled self-incrimination, there must be affirmative evidence of a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver in the record. Id. at 242–43.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209–10 (1995); Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 802–03 (1989); Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225 (1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17,
30–32 (1973); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749–55 (1970).
77 See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005); Mabry v. Johnson, 467
U.S. 504, 508 (1984); Brady, 397 U.S. at 757.
78 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971). Although some cases, in rather
conclusory terms, characterize the pressure that a defendant experiences when deciding
whether to testify as something other than “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, see, e.g., Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 286–87 (1998);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83–85 (1970); that view is strikingly unpersuasive. As
we have seen, Bram properly concluded that a suspect facing the threat of criminal prosecution if he does not speak is subjected to compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. A view that denies the existence of similar compulsion during a criminal
trial—when the threat of conviction is even closer at hand—comports with neither Bram,
the historically understood meaning of compulsion, or common sense.
79 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (citations omitted) (quoting Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937), and Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities
Comm’n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
80 Id.
81 384 U.S. at 444, 475.
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Miranda requires that an individual in custody be advised of
his right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him, and of his right to have counsel present during interrogation.82 These rights are nowhere to be found in the Fifth
Amendment itself, but this advice ensures that a defendant understands that he has no obligation to participate in custodial interrogation. The right to counsel, in particular, informs the suspect that if he wishes expert advice as he assesses whether to
participate in custodial interrogation, it may be had. Advising
the suspect of the availability of expert legal advice clearly provides a far more comprehensive offer of aid in assessing the risks
of submitting to interrogation than any formulaic warning that
the Court could have advised. The right to counsel is perhaps the
most debatable of the Miranda rights, since that right seems to
inhere in the Sixth and not the Fifth Amendment.83 But if one
rigorously applies the rule that indulges every reasonable presumption against waiver, it is quite defensible to conclude that
suspects cannot be expected to make knowing and intelligent decisions if they are unaware of the availability of expert legal advice.84
Once advised of these rights, moreover, a suspect’s decision
to submit to custodial interrogation is properly characterized as
an intentional relinquishment of a known right.85 The Fifth
Amendment, after all, secures no more than a right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination. The Miranda warnings ensure that the suspect knows that he need not participate in interrogation and is being asked to surrender that right. For purposes of the Fifth Amendment, no more is required to obtain a
valid waiver, at least under the settled principles of waiver law
that Miranda applied. As we have seen, a waiver is valid as long
as a suspect intentionally relinquishes a known right, and the
Miranda warnings ensure that a suspect knows that he has a
Id. at 444, 467–72.
See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman, and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV.
359, 397–403, 434–38 (2001).
84 Precisely because the Miranda right to counsel can be defended only based upon a
rather generous presumption against a knowing and intelligent waiver, it may be that
there are some circumstances, such as interrogation overseas where competent counsel is
not readily available, in which this rule for waiver becomes overgenerous and should be
abandoned. For additional consideration of the applicability of Miranda to interrogation
overseas, see M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of
Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 345–54 (2003); M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons
from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241,
271–86 (2002); Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A
Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1770–80 (2002).
85 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372–75 (1979).
82
83
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right to remain silent and is facing a decision whether to relinquish his right when he is asked to waive. Thus, while Miranda
does not eliminate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, it instead produces a valid waiver of the right to be free
from that compulsion.
Understanding Miranda warnings as a recipe for valid
waiver explains as well the Court’s invitation for “potential alternatives for protecting the privilege” that are “at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it . . . .”86 There is
no single form of words necessary for a valid waiver; any advice
that enables a suspect to make a knowing and intelligent decision about Fifth Amendment rights will comport with constitutional standards.87 That does not make the warnings prophylactic; it makes them one among many alternatives that could
produce a valid waiver of constitutional rights.88
To be sure, many interrogators are adept at using some combination of threats and inducements to convince suspects to submit to interrogation—and even to confess—regardless of whether
it was in the suspect’s interest to do so. I certainly tried to do
just that when I was a prosecutor. Thus, I freely acknowledge
that if they are to protect their own legal interests most efficaciously, suspects would probably be well advised to consult with
an attorney before deciding to submit to interrogation.89 It is also
probably true that many suspects have undeserved confidence in
their ability to talk their way out of their troubles.90 Perhaps it
384 U.S. at 467.
Indeed, the Court has tolerated some variation in the language of the required
warnings that is not thought to dilute their efficacy. See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S.
195 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (per curiam).
88 Thus, in some sense the warnings amount to a “safe harbor.” See Michael C. Dorf
& Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 61, 81–85.
The safe harbor, however, is within the law of waiver, and is not based on an absence of
compulsion. The warnings do not eliminate the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation by creating a safe harbor of voluntariness; if they did, then the Court would have
held that the warnings without more could produce an admissible statement. To the contrary, the Court made plain that even with the requisite warnings, a statement is inadmissible unless the government can discharge its burden of proving a valid waiver. See
384 U.S. at 475–77. See also Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470–71 (1980) (per curiam); Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
89 Even this rule of thumb is not unqualified. In my experience, both prosecutors
and judges make a special effort to acknowledge cooperation that was offered from the
start, without need of counsel or a negotiated arrangement. It is, in my view, at least a
modest overstatement to claim that a suspect is never well-advised to cooperate with the
authorities during uncounseled custodial interrogation.
90 See Thomas, supra note 30, at 1106–12. There is at least some empirical evidence
to support this view. Using volunteer subjects under laboratory conditions, Saul Kassin
and Rebecca Norwick found that the most likely reason simulated suspects gave for waiving their Miranda rights was their belief that they could convince their interrogators of
their innocence. See Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive their
86
87
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is even true that most persons in custody feel intimidated and
are reluctant to invoke their rights.91 But once a suspect has
waived his right to be free from compelled self-incrimination, an
insistence on further safeguards is vulnerable to Justice Scalia’s
charge that under the Fifth Amendment, the Court may not
properly concern itself with “[p]reventing foolish (rather than
compelled) confessions.”92
In particular, when a suspect waives his rights under
Miranda, the suspect has knowingly and intentionally decided to
make his own assessment of the risks and benefits of submitting
to custodial interrogation without expert advice. A decision to
proceed with interrogation without counsel under such circumstances may be foolish, but it nevertheless satisfies the settled
standards for a valid waiver. 93 As we have seen, the traditional
standard for waiver merely requires an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Thus, a valid waiver does not require
Miranda Rights: The Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211 (2004). Although
caution is necessary in treating laboratory experiments involving volunteers who face
stakes that are much lower than those in the criminal justice system as indicative of the
behavior of actual suspects, this supposition is corroborated by evidence that unsuccessful
experience with the criminal justice system makes suspects less likely to submit to interrogation. Leo found that suspects with felony records were almost four times more likely
to invoke their rights during custodial interrogation than suspects with no record, and
almost three times more likely to invoke than suspects with only a misdemeanor record.
See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
286–87 (1996). It would make sense that if suspects’ belief in their ability to convince interrogators of their innocence motivates most waivers, then suspects who have learned
that they are unable to persuade interrogators of their innocence are less likely to waive.
My own experience was that suspects had a wide variety of reasons for wanting to talk
with interrogators, but a belief in their ability to talk their way out of trouble was certainly one of the most common motives that I perceived.
91 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865,
880–82 (1981) (reviewing YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980)).
92 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 449 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93 This point also demonstrates the non-prophylactic character of the secondary protection offered by the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), that when a suspect invokes the right to counsel recognized in Miranda, the authorities may not subsequently communicate with the suspect unless communication is initiated by the suspect.
Id. at 484–85. Once an accused has indicated that he doubts his own ability to make a
waiver decision in the absence of expert assistance, the presumption against waiver amply supports the conclusion that the suspect should not be pressed to make such a decision. The suspect’s invocation is itself powerful evidence that the suspect cannot make a
knowing and intelligent waiver decision in the absence of counsel. As the Court has put
it, “the accused having expressed his own view that he is not competent to deal with the
authorities without legal advice, a later decision at the authorities’ insistence to make a
statement without counsel’s presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.” Arizona
v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2
(1975) (White, J., concurring in the result)). When a suspect invokes only the right to silence but expresses no desire for expert assistance in assessing his options, there is no
similar basis for doubting the suspect’s knowing and intelligent desire to make a waiver
decision without advice, and hence a different standard is in order. See Roberson, 486
U.S. at 683; Mosley, 423 U.S. at 109–10 (White, J., concurring in the result).
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that the defendant be able to correctly assess his interests or free
himself from the pressures created by a potential prosecution or
conviction; it only requires that a defendant make an intentional
decision to surrender a right of which he is aware.94 A valid
waiver requires that the defendant knows he has an identified
right and intends to waive it; but the defendant need “not know
the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.”95 Indeed, the
Court has “never read the Constitution to require that the police
supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him calibrate
his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand by his
rights.”96
Thus, the Miranda warnings rest on a traditional conception
of waiver. It may be that most suspects make bad decisions
about whether to submit to custodial interrogation, but settled
waiver law instructs us that this provides no basis for invalidating a waiver.97 Indeed, under the guilty-plea cases, even if the
accused and his counsel misapprehend the strength of the prosecution’s case or the availability of defenses, a guilty plea is still
considered a valid waiver.98 A Miranda waiver is certainly no
94 See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 90–92 (2004); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S.
285, 292–93 (1988); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979).
95 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002).
96 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). For example:
The Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee is both simpler and more fundamental: A defendant may not be compelled to be a witness against himself in any
respect. The Miranda warnings protect this privilege by ensuring that a suspect knows that he may choose not to talk to law enforcement officers, to talk
only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at any time. The Miranda
warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights is knowing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of this constitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever he chooses to say may be used as evidence
against him.
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) (citations omitted).
97 See supra text accompanying notes 74–78.
98 See, e.g., Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630; United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 571–72
(1989); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–70 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 756–57 (1970). Thus, although Robert Mosteller has argued that any type of
what could be characterized as official deception should be forbidden prior to the time
that a waiver is obtained (see Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case for a Per Se Prohibition Against an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the
Most Critical Moment, 39 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 1239, 1263-72 (2007)), this approach is difficult to reconcile with traditional principles of waiver. Waiver law asks whether the
suspect knew of the rights at issue and intended to surrender them and not whether he
was able to accurately assess his interests at the time of the waiver. Deception as to, say,
the strength of the evidence against the suspect may lead him to overvalue the benefits of
submitting to interrogation, but this type of error has never been thought to impair a
waiver. To the contrary, it has long been settled that “the Constitution . . . . permits a
court to accept a guilty plea, with its accompanying waiver of various constitutional
rights,despite various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor.”
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630. Applying these principles, the Court has held that a Miranda
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less valid if the suspect somehow misapprehends his own best interests. To be sure, defendants undertaking plea bargaining
usually have counsel at their side, while suspects undergoing
custodial interrogation usually do not.99 Still, Miranda grants
suspects subject to custodial interrogation a right to counsel, and
we have seen that waiver of this right under Miranda comports
with traditional waiver principles.100 Nor is there any plausible
basis to treat the right to counsel as nonwaivable; indeed, it is
now settled that even the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel
can be extrajudicially waived by an uncounseled defendant as
long as the waiver has been preceded by Miranda warnings.101
One can disagree with the traditional rules for waiver, but
Miranda is faithful to them, and one cannot criticize Miranda on
this basis without developing a new and as-yet unprecedented
conception of waiver of constitutional rights.102 After all, the
waiver is valid even though, prior to obtaining the waiver, federal agents failed to disclose
to a suspect arrested on a weapons charge that the true object of the investigation was an
unsolved murder in which the arrestee was a suspect. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S.
564, 573–79 (1987). While there was no affirmative misrepresentation in that case, it is
difficult to understand why deception by omission has any different consequences for the
knowing, intelligent, or voluntary character of a waiver than deception through affirmative misrepresentation. .
99 Brady, 397 U.S. at 753–54.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 74–96.
101 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292–97 (1988).
102 Professor Godsey proposes that in addition to traditional Miranda warnings, suspects be further advised that silence cannot be used against them, that they have a right
to stop questioning at any time, and that warnings be readministered during lengthy interrogations. See Godsey, supra note 32, at 810, 813–15. See also Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1054–61 (1988) (contending that waivers
should be readministered during lengthy interrogations or when the topic of interrogation
shifts). At least some aspects of this proposal are hard to support under current law. As
for an admonition that a suspect’s silence cannot be used against him, it is hard to identify this as a right that a suspect must knowingly and intelligently waive when he receives warnings. When Miranda warnings are administered, a suspect is not being asked
to waive a right he then enjoys, i.e., not to have silence used against him, because preMiranda silence can be used to infer a suspect’s guilt. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603
(1982) (per curiam); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980). There is instead only a
right not to have post-Miranda silence used as evidence of guilt. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976). It may be that knowledge of the post-Miranda right is useful to a suspect
when deciding whether to assert his right to remain silent, but as we have seen, the Supreme Court has never required that a suspect, when deciding whether to invoke a constitutional right, must “know the specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” Ruiz, 536
U.S. at 629. Nor has the Court “require[d] that the police supply a suspect with a flow of
information to help him calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand
by his rights.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986). This same point suggests
that waiver law does not require that a suspect be permitted to reassess the tactical value
of waiver whenever the subject of interrogation shifts or during lengthy interrogations.
Moreover, a right to have warnings readministered is difficult to support under traditional waiver law, which, as we have seen, requires only that the decision to waive be
knowing and intelligent, not that the suspect be encouraged to revisit that decision periodically. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam). Nevertheless, in Miranda
the Court stressed that warnings must be an effective means of “apprising accused per-
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Fifth Amendment protects suspects against compulsion, not improvidence. If a suspect is willing to submit to interrogation under compulsive circumstances, it is unclear at best why the Fifth
Amendment should be thought to forbid him from doing so
merely because the waiver is likely to be improvident. Whatever
one might be protecting by insisting on some new and more demanding test for waiver, it certainly is not the right to be free
from compelled self-incrimination. Thus, when the Court explains that it has “never read the Constitution to require that the
police supply a suspect with a flow of information to help him
calibrate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or stand
by his rights,”103 it is far from apparent what is wrong with that
conception of waiver, at least for purposes of protecting Fifth
Amendment rights.104
Thus, the non-prophylactic account of Miranda that I have
offered involves rather settled Fifth Amendment and waiver law.
As I have demonstrated, Miranda rests on a conception of comsons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it . . . .”
384 U.S. at 467. That might support an additional admonition that a suspect can invoke
his right to remain silent at any time, or a need for repeated warnings during lengthy interrogations, although it is worth noting that in Miranda itself the Court did not think
that its reasoning required the additional warnings advocated by Professor Godsey. Accordingly, if there is a justification for doctrinal reform in order to support these proposals, it is presumably a prophylactic one. Professor Godsey, however, adduces little empirical support for such reform in the interests of prophylaxis. Although Professor Godsey
claims that suspects frequently fail to invoke their Miranda rights because they believe
that an assertion of rights will be taken as an admission of guilt, see Godsey, supra note
32, at 793–96, the supporting evidence he cites reveals that the only empirical evidence
derived from actual interrogations consists of the interview of a single suspect. See Ofshe
& Leo, supra note 34, at 1002. We have seen, however, that other empirical evidence suggests that suspects choose to submit to custodial interrogation because they believe that
they can persuade interrogators of their innocence, see supra note 90, and not because
they fear that their silence will be used against them, believe that they lack the right to
stop questioning, or forget their rights during the course of lengthy interrogation. Moreover, Professor Godsey’s proposal might actually encourage suspects to waive their rights
imprudently in the belief that they will be free to retract the waiver. In the absence of
empirical study, it is hard to know whether this additional warning would make suspects’
decisions more or less considered. Eugene Milhizer goes even further, arguing that in addition to advising a suspect of his right to stop questioning at any time, the warnings
should be reformulated to advise the suspects of the potential benefits of truthful cooperation. See Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 99–107 (2006). We have
seen, however, that requiring that a suspect not only know his rights but receive helpful
information in order to assess his own interests would require a rather dramatic reformulation of the law of waiver. In any event, if there is an argument for additional prophylactic protection of a suspect’s ability to engage in careful balancing of the tactical considerations relating to interrogation, his ability to invoke his right to have counsel present
during interrogation would seemingly be the most efficacious means of protecting that
interest.
103 Burbine, 475 U.S. at 422.
104 For helpful elaboration on this point, see Berger, supra note 102, at 1042–51. I
consider the case for greater regulation of interrogation under the Due Process Clause in
Part II infra.
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pulsion traceable to Bram, and an equally settled conception of
waiver.105 Treating Miranda as a form of prophylactic constitutional law, in contrast, is a far more radical approach than that
outlined here, and far less faithful to Miranda itself.106 It is remarkable that courts and commentators alike have so readily accepted the reinterpretation of Miranda as prophylactic that began in Tucker—in other words, that custodial interrogation does
not inherently involve compulsion—without any apparent recognition of the tension between such an assumption and both Bram
and the concept of “compulsion” under the Fifth Amendment.
II. THE CONSTITUTION IS NOT PERFECT: THE FLAWED CASE FOR
ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF INTERROGATION
The available empirical evidence on the implementation of
Miranda,107 although limited, indicates that suspects subjected to
105 A non-prophylactic conception of Miranda would not even necessarily require alteration of the scope of the Miranda exclusionary rule, at least when it comes to impeachment evidence. When an unwarned statement is sufficiently reliable to have probative value as impeachment, it is far from clear that the government has “compelled” a
defendant to become a witness against himself when the statement becomes admissible
only because the defendant has elected to testify inconsistently with the statement. Indeed, before the Court began referring to Miranda as a prophylactic rule, it held that unwarned but reliable statements were admissible for impeachment purposes. See Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). For a lengthier argument in favor of this conclusion, see
Donald Dripps, Is the Miranda Caselaw Really Inconsistent? A Proposed Fifth Amendment
Synthesis, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 19, 27–43 (2000). The argument for derivative use of
unwarned statements in the prosecution’s case-in-chief, however, is considerably stronger.
See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Response: On the “Fruits” of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REV. 929 (1995). Indeed, on the originalist
view that the term “witness” includes anyone who provides the prosecution with physical
or documentary evidence, even when no testimonial use is made of the act of production
and only the physical or documentary evidence itself is introduced at trial, see United
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 49–56 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring), the Fifth Amendment itself would prohibit the introduction of the nontestimonial fruits of any compelled
provision of evidence to the prosecution.
106 In Miranda itself, the Court acknowledged that it “might not find the defendants’
statements [in the four consolidated cases at bar] to have been involuntary in traditional
terms.” 384 U.S. at 457. This should not be taken as an acknowledgement that the Court
was departing from traditional Fifth Amendment standards. The voluntariness test is
anchored in the Due Process Clause, which provides protection against the admission into
evidence of an involuntary confession separate and apart from the Fifth Amendment right
against compelled self-incrimination. See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688–89,
693–94 (1993); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985). But by the time of
Miranda, as we have seen, the Fifth Amendment had become applicable to state prosecutions. Thus, “involuntary in traditional terms” refers to the due process test.
107 In invoking empirical evidence, I do not mean to enter the debate over the effects
of Miranda on rates of confession and crime-solving. For a useful summary of the evidence on that point, see George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v.
Arizona: “Embedded” in our National Culture?, in 29 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF
RESEARCH 203, 232–45 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002). In my view, this is one of those debates
that turns to a critical degree on whether Miranda is prophylactic. If it is, then consideration of its costs and benefits is amply warranted, as Professor Strauss has argued, see
Strauss, supra note 18, at 967; if not, then even if Miranda has adversely affected law enforcement, that is a price that the Constitution requires be paid.
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custodial interrogation invoke their right to halt the interrogation about twenty percent of the time, with the vast majority of
invocations occurring at the point at which warnings are administered.108 One of the most prominent members of the Mirandais-a-failure school, William Stuntz, thinks that this evidence
means that Miranda fails to effectively regulate interrogation because the rate of invocation is so low, and because invocations are
so concentrated at the time warnings are given, that Miranda
provides too little regulatory bite over the course of the subsequent interrogation.109 He contends that Miranda’s approach is
to combat police overreaching by relying on suspects to invoke
their rights, but the data, he argues, demonstrates that “suspects
cannot do the kind of sorting that Miranda doctrine calls for.”110
Professor Stuntz’s critique is puzzling. As we have seen, the
only “sorting” that Miranda expects of suspects is that they will
knowingly and intelligently decide whether to waive their Fifth
Amendment rights, and under settled waiver principles, suspects
facing interrogation are perfectly competent to engage in such
“sorting.” In any event, it is unclear what kind of abuses Professor Stuntz thinks are going on during post-warning custodial interrogation that cry out for additional regulation. The Fifth
Amendment, as we have also seen, is satisfied by a valid waiver
under Miranda. To be sure, a suspect who has waived Miranda
rights has not also waived his analytically distinct due process
right to exclude from evidence an involuntary confession.111 But
Richard Leo’s study, which Professor Stuntz himself labels as
“the most thorough to date,”112 establishes not only that levels of

108 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 59, at 859–60; Leo, supra note 32, at 653. There
were a number of studies in the immediate wake of Miranda that also reflected about a
twenty percent invocation rate. See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387, 495–96 (1996). There was a puzzling lack of further empirical study of Miranda until the mid-1990s. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 59,
at 843–49. As Professor Schulhofer notes, there is cause for concern about the reliability
of the immediate post-Miranda studies since they cover a period in which Miranda was
still novel and the police had not yet adapted their tactics to its commands. See Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 506–10 (1996). Nevertheless, the consistency of the invocation rate in the post-Miranda and later studies suggests that at least on this point,
the earlier studies may be reliable indications of Miranda’s current effects. The most recent study of juveniles also found about a twenty percent invocation rate, see Barry C.
Feld, Juveniles’ Competence to Exercise Miranda Rights: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 26, 82 (2006), although an earlier study of juveniles had found
that they invoke their rights at a rate of less than ten percent. See THOMAS GRISSO,
JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 35–36 (1981).
109 See Stuntz, supra note 30, at 986–92.
110 Id. at 991.
111 See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 688–89, 693–94 (1993); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397–98 (1978).
112 Stuntz, supra note 30, at 990.
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compliance with Miranda are high,113 but also that the incidence
of coercion during custodial interrogation is low, only about two
percent.114 Even a study of judicial opinions available on Westlaw involving challenges to confessions—hardly a random sample—found no reason to doubt Professor Leo’s findings on coercion.115
My own experience with custodial interrogation is consistent
with this data, but does not lead me to Professor Stuntz’s conclusion. My rough guess is that perhaps twenty percent of the custodial interrogations in which I participated as a prosecutor produced invocations, although my memory is vague; it could have
been as high as one-third. But I very clearly remember that in
every case, invocations occurred when the warnings were administered. In my experience, that pattern reflects the potency of the
warnings—as I still vividly recall, the moment at which I administered warnings and solicited a waiver was the point in the process where I always felt a striking loss of control. At that point in
the process, I could not advocate for cooperation; I had to stop
and let the suspect ponder both the warnings and my request for
a waiver. Small wonder that invocations cluster at that point. If
suspects attached little meaning or significance to Miranda
warnings, or if interrogators were somehow able to deemphasize
them, invocations would occur in a more random pattern
throughout the course of questioning.
113 See Leo, supra note 90, at 275–76. Accord Cassell & Hayman, supra note 59, at
888–90; Feld, supra note 108, at 71; George C. Thomas III, Stories about Miranda, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1959, 1975 (2004). There is, however, some evidence that some police departments have engaged in unwarned questioning as a matter of policy, providing warnings only after incriminating statements are obtained and then inducing the suspects to
repeat those statements in compliance with Miranda. See Weisselberg, supra note 16, at
136–39. It is difficult to characterize this as police misconduct, since this tactic was seemingly sanctioned in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985); indeed, the author of the
Elstad opinion (and three other Justices of the Supreme Court) thought that such an approach had been condoned by that decision. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 627–29
(2004) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In any event, this practice is likely to come to a halt in
light of the conclusion of a majority of the Court in Seibert that deliberate use of two-stage
questioning with warnings given only after an incriminating statement is made will lead
to suppression. See id. at 614 (plurality opinion); id. at 620–22 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment). See also Steven D. Clymer, Are Police Free to Disregard Miranda?, 112
YALE L.J. 447, 545–47 (2002).
114 See Leo, supra note 90, at 282–84. The other leading study in recent years of
Miranda’s implementation reached a similar conclusion. See Cassell & Hayman, supra
note 59, at 888–94, 920. Although the interrogators in the Leo study knew they were being observed, Leo convincingly explains why that ultimately did not skew the data. See
Leo, supra note 90, at 270–72. Barry Feld’s recent study of juvenile interrogations also
found no evidence of coercion. See Feld, supra note 108, at 70–90. Professor Leo’s work is
full of anecdotes describing what he regards as police overreaching, although the anecdotes are unaccompanied by any statistics establishing that these practices occur with
frequency. See, e.g., Leo & White, supra note 45, at 431–50; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 34,
at 1001–14.
115 See Thomas, supra note 113, at 1962, 1980–95.
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But put all this aside. Even crediting Professor Stuntz’s
fears, Miranda is not properly labeled a failure. Miranda states
only a single objective—to achieve compliance with the Fifth
Amendment by ensuring that custodial interrogations occur only
upon a valid waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to be free from
compelled self-incrimination.116 No other objective is properly
open to a court under the Fifth Amendment, which forbids, as we
have seen, only compelled confessions, and not improvident ones.
Nothing in Professor Stuntz’s account explains why Miranda
fails on this score. As I demonstrate above, Miranda produces
valid waivers under long-settled conceptions of waiver. The
waivers may often be foolish, but they are made with full awareness of the rights foregone.
There is, accordingly, no case to be made against Miranda on
its own terms. At best, Professor Stuntz’s critique supports an
argument that there is some sort of police abuse during postwarning interrogation that requires additional regulation, but
such an argument is not based on the inherent compulsion in
custodial interrogation. Demanding better post-waiver regulation of interrogation under the Due Process Clause is easier said
than done. Consider videotaping interrogations, perhaps the
most common recommendation offered by the Miranda-is-afailure camp.117 There is little doctrinal support for constitutionally mandated videotaping; the Court has held that the Due
Process Clause does not require that the prosecution create or
preserve evidence merely because it is potentially exculpatory.118
As the Court has written, it is “unwilling[ ] to . . . impos[e] on the
police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance” absent a showing that “the police themselves by their
conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant.”119 Thus, at least when a law enforcement
agency’s standard policy involves no taping of interrogation,
there is little doctrinal basis for a constitutional attack.
Perhaps doctrinal innovation would be warranted if videotaping yielded clear benefits, but it is unclear what videotaping is
expected to accomplish. We have seen that there is little empirical evidence that noncompliance with Miranda or coercion during
interrogation is common.120 There is also little evidence that
See 384 U.S. at 467, 478–79.
See supra note 32.
See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 56–59 (1988); California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479, 485–90 (1984).
119 Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58.
120 See supra text accompanying note 113.
116
117
118
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credibility disputes are common in litigation about custodial interrogation; George Thomas’s review of custodial interrogation
cases available on Westlaw disclosed that only four percent
turned on the credibility of the participants.121 Thus, there is little reason to believe that videotaping is likely to improve
Miranda compliance or enhance the reliability of factfinding—
there is simply not much empirical evidence that either is a significant problem.122 Nor is videotaping likely to deter abuse even
if it is infrequent—a truly sadistic officer will indulge himself in
a location without cameras, and would be prepared to lie about
what he has done after the fact.
Thus, we cannot expect videotaping to curb what are already
deemed abuses under current law, which, in any event, have not
been shown to be common. Moreover, in the absence of substantive regulation of interrogation techniques, it is unclear how
videotaping is expected to lead to more effective regulation of interrogation. In Frazier v. Cupp,123 for example, the interrogation
was taped,124 and yet that did not stop the police from deceiving
the suspect by falsely claiming that his accomplice had confessed.125 Thus, while a common claim of the Miranda-is-afailure camp is that police deception during interrogation should
be curbed,126 videotaping will not lead to that objective. Given
the political pressure to apprehend lawbreakers, the police can be
expected to employ every lawful means for obtaining confessions,
and therefore videotaping will not likely deter tactics that the
courts condone.127 One may dislike the kind of tactics recomSee Thomas, supra note 113, at 1982–83.
An additional argument made in support of videotaping is that it will improve assessments of the voluntariness of confessions because it will enable the trier of fact to determine whether the suspect volunteered critical facts about the crime that were not publicly known or whether those facts were in fact supplied by interrogators. Leo, et al.,
supra note 31, at 511. But again, absent a rule forbidding the police from utilizing such
facts during interrogation, it is unclear that evidence of the use of such tactics will have
much of an effect. In violent crimes, for example, I would sometimes confront a suspect
with particularly grisly aspects of the physical evidence in an effort to shake the suspect
and suggest that laboratory analysis would ultimately link him to the crime. In my experience, juries are frequently sympathetic to this type of explanation for what might initially seem an overly aggressive interrogation tactic.
123 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
124 Id. at 737.
125 Id. at 737–39. Similarly, although Professor Feld advocates videotaping interrogations, the videotapes that he observed did not prevent what he regarded as improper, if
subtle, efforts to influence juveniles to waive their rights similar to those observed by Professor Leo. See Feld, supra note 108, at 28, 90–99. The same was true of Professor Leo’s
study, in which he was actually present during interrogation, or observed videotaped interrogations, and nevertheless observed a variety of tactics that he viewed as unduly coercive. See Leo, supra note 90, at 269–72, 292–303.
126 See supra note 35.
127 Although videotaping advocates do not make the point, perhaps they believe that
police will engage in self-regulation if they are concerned that juries will react adversely
121
122
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mended by the manuals that encourage a suspect to believe that
cooperation is in his interest, but absent substantive reform limiting the kinds of appeals that interrogators may make—before
or after soliciting waivers—videotaping alone will not change interrogators’ behavior.
The same problem infects proposals to require judges to undertake some sort of stricter review of the reliability and voluntariness of confessions.128 The advocates of this approach frequently invoke the Central Park Jogger case to support their
proposals for independent judicial review of the reliability of confessions.129 In that case, three of the five defendants were arrested near the scene of a brutal assault and rape shortly after it
occurred, at a time at which roving bands of youths had committed multiple assaults in the park; five suspects then confessed to
participating in the assault while denying personal involvement
in the rape; each confession provided details about the involvement of the other defendants; and three of the confessions were
videotaped in the presence of the suspects’ parents.130 Nevertheless, the confessions were false; DNA evidence, tested years later,
identified as the rapist another individual not linked to any of
the defendants.131
The Central Park Jogger case is an uncertain poster child for
more muscular judicial review of confessions. To be sure, there
were inconsistencies in the Central Park Jogger confessions as
each offender accused others of playing a principal role,132 but in
cases involving joint action this is commonplace; in their confessions, offenders frequently endeavor to minimize their own
role.133 Indeed, the advocates of these reforms make no claim
that confessions accompanied by these kinds of inconsistencies
are usually unreliable; and they make no effort as well to identify
to what they perceive to be overly aggressive interrogation techniques. No empirical evidence has yet surfaced of such an effect, however, in jurisdictions that perform videotaping. As a prosecutor, I would have advised investigators to continue to utilize all lawful
interrogation techniques during videotaped confessions, while seeking appropriate instructions informing the jury that the police used only lawful interrogation techniques
during the videotaped session. It is therefore unclear at best that in such circumstances
videotaping would have any predictable and significant regulatory bite, especially given
the reality that juries are likely to approve of the use of such tactics when they are told
they are lawful means to solve serious crimes.
128 See supra note 34.
129 Davies, supra note 34, at 230–52; Leo, et al., supra note 31, at 479–87.
130 See TIMOTHY SULLIVAN, UNEQUAL VERDICTS: THE CENTRAL PARK JOGGER TRIALS
23–47, 84–85 (1992); Davies, supra note 34, at 215–16; Leo et al., supra note 31, at 479–
82.
131 See Davies, supra note 34, at 220–22; Leo et al., supra note 31, at 482–84.
132 See Davies, supra note 34, at 244; Leo et al., supra note 31, at 536–37.
133 See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 138–39 (1999); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 544–45 (1986).
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anything approximating an error rate for confessions of this type.
In the Central Park Jogger case, for example, given that three
defendants had been arrested near the scene of the crime, and
that all five had been placed there by other witnesses, perhaps
only with the benefit of hindsight can one confidently say that a
judge should have deemed the confessions insufficiently reliable
to be put before a jury.
Thus, the proposals for more searching reliability review
come with all the hazards of regulation by anecdote; it is unclear
whether the Central Park Jogger case reflects a systemic problem or is a bizarre outlier—perhaps borne of the fact that the defendants may well have participated in other assaults in the park
that night and therefore were willing to admit a role in an assault without understanding their vicarious liability for the rape
itself. For her part, one of the principal advocates of searching
judicial scrutiny of confessions, Sharon Davies, does not propose
a per se rule that interlocking but inconsistent confessions of persons found near the scene of a crime are never admissible absent
some additional corroboration; she instead proposes a nonexclusive list of at least ten factors.134 Ten-factor tests are
unlikely, however, to produce predictable outcomes. Professor
Davies makes little effort to defend her ten-factor test as an effective means of regulation in itself; instead she speculates that
judges will do a better job than juries because their training and
experience gives them greater expertise in evaluating the reliability of confessions.135 She identifies no empirical evidence to
support this claim, however, and with reason. For more than
four decades, the Due Process Clause has been understood to require judges to make an independent finding of voluntariness before permitting a confession to be presented to a jury.136 If judicial training and experience enabled judges to identify
confessions that are the result of undue police pressure, then we
should have expected that judges would have learned long ago
how to smoke out confessions that were the likely result of police
pressure under the rubric of voluntariness. After all, the requirement that judges make an independent finding of voluntariness permits as searching a review as is necessary to assure
the court that a confession has not been induced by police over134 See Davies, supra note 34, at 242–43. Professor Stuntz, for his part, is unable to
identify any set of criteria to govern judicial review of interrogation techniques. See
Stuntz, supra note 30, at 995–98. Professor Kamisar has similarly argued that custodial
interrogation ought to take place in the presence of a judicial officer with the power to
regulate the process, but is similarly unable to specify the criteria that should govern
such regulation. See KAMISAR, supra note 34.
135 See Davies, supra note 34, at 250–52.
136 See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964).
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reaching or an overborne will.137 The fact that judges seem not to
have developed what Professor Davies regards as reliable methods for screening out police-induced false confessions suggests
that judicial expertise is not likely to solve the problem with
which she is concerned.
Professor Leo, in addition to advocating mandatory videotaping if feasible (although the Central Park Jogger case would seem
to argue against the efficacy of videotaping), would require a
court to weigh three factors: whether the confession contains
nonpublic information that can be independently verified;
whether the confession led the authorities to discover new evidence; and whether the suspect’s confession is consistent with
the objective evidence.138 Thus, like Professor Davies, Professor
Leo advocates a discretionary test, rather than per se rules,
again with good reason. As the late Welsh White observed, it
makes little sense to exclude all confessions that are not corroborated by nonpublic information—that approach would make admissibility turn on frequently fortuitous circumstances that determine whether there is nonpublic information about the
circumstances underlying a particular crime that can be used to
independently corroborate a confession.139 Indeed, Professor
White may have been understating the problem. In my experience, it was difficult to get even highly motivated cooperating defendants to remember the details of crimes they had committed.
Given the level at which most offenders operate, my guess is that
Professor Leo is asking for an unrealistic degree of corroboration—certainly he provides no empirical evidence that the level of
corroboration that he would require is usually present in truthful
confessions. In any event, his balancing test, preserving as it
does the ample discretion that inheres in all balancing tests, of137 While the voluntariness test, as framed by the Court, requires an inquiry into police overreaching rather then reliability per se, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
167 (1986), the voluntariness test is broad enough to reach an unwarranted effort by the
police to induce a suspect willing only to admit to a relatively minor crime to link himself
to a far more serious one. As the Court has put it: “the admissibility of a confession turns
as much on whether the techniques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction
will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defendant’s will was in fact
overborne.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 116 (1985).
138 See Leo et al., supra note 31, at 531. George Thomas has advanced proposal along
somewhat the same lines to exclude confessions that are a product of interrogation techniques that involve both high pressure and large incentives to confess. See George C.
Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 39 TEXAS TECH. L. REV.
1293, 1298–1317 (2007). This proposal, like that of Professor Leo, seems to involve at
least as much judicial discretion as Professor Davies’ approach, and it is far from clear
that its actual operation would differ in any meaningful respect from the traditional voluntariness inquiry.
139 See Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
2001, 2024–28 (1998).
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fers little guarantee that judicial screening of confessions will
improve. The traditional voluntariness test requires judges to
consider all of the factors identified by Professor Leo when assessing the admissibility of a confession, and yet by his own account, it has failed to weed out coerced confessions.
Thus, it is far from apparent that reliability review would be
more effective than the voluntariness review that predominated
prior to Miranda, and which most commentators have condemned as having failed to produce consistent and effective regulation.140 It is equally unclear that the judiciary could speak with
sufficient uniformity on interrogation tactics to constitute a reliable regulator.
Given the malleability of the voluntariness/reliability tests, it is unclear that a more muscular form of
judicial review of confessions would be consistent or principled.141
140 See, e.g., MARK BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 104–12 (1980); KAMISAR, A Dissent, supra note
51, at 69–76; WHITE, supra note 30, at 39–48; Godsey, supra note 35, at 468–71; Ogletree,
supra note 33, at 1833–35; Penney, supra note 65, at 337–62; Schulhofer, supra note 91,
at 869–72; Seidman, supra note 30, at 727–36; Weisselberg, supra note 16, at 113–16.
Even Professor Stuntz, another important advocate of greater judicial regulation of confessions, has acknowledged, “once one assumes that some pressure is acceptable, it is very
hard to define how much pressure is too much.” Stuntz, supra note 30, at 980. Professor
Godsey attempts to solve this problem by arguing that interrogators should be forbidden
to threaten to impose what would be objectively characterized as a penalty on a suspect
during interrogation to punish silence or encourage a confession, while acknowledging
that a threat to seek the suspect’s conviction or an offer of leniency if the suspect cooperates should not be viewed as a penalty. See Godsey, supra note 35, at 515–38. It is unclear that this proposal is any different than existing law; indeed, Professor Godsey
makes no effort to demonstrate that courts currently admit confessions obtained through
what he regards as improper penalties. There is reason to be skeptical on this point. See,
e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (inducing confession by threats that defendant would lose custody of her children); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (inducing confession by threat that suspect’s friend woujld lose his job if suspect failed to cooperate). See also Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just about Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness
of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 619–21 (2006) (reviewing
cases). Moreover, as we will see below, the empirical work performed to date has not disclosed the use of such punitive tactics as a significant cause of false confessions. In any
event, Professor Godsey’s concession that a confession made in the hope of leniency does
not invalidate a resulting confession confirms the propriety of the most commonly used
interrogation techniques.
141 For example, despite supposed judicial expertise in sentencing, the empirical evidence on pre-guidelines sentencing demonstrated the existence of substantial inter-judge
sentencing disparities that were, among other things, the impetus for state and federal
sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Blakeley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 315–20 (2004)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 332 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Theresa W. Karle & Thomas
Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical
and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 395 (1991); Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REV. 267, 272–74 (1977); David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic,
and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 285, 311–12 (2001); Ilene H. Nagel, Foreword: Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895–97
(1990); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227–28 (1993).
There is little reason not to expect similar disparities in judicial attitudes toward interro-
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To be sure, judicial regulation would have relatively predictable regulatory consequences if it were based upon clear rules.
The best example of such an approach comes from those who advocate the abolition of custodial interrogation by the police.142
The proponents of this approach argue that valid waivers cannot
be given by suspects who are subject to the pressures of custodial
interrogation.143 The advocates of abolition of custodial interrogation, however, make little effort to explain how their position
can be squared with longstanding principles of waiver. As we
have seen, the settled rule is that a suspect can validly waive
constitutional rights when he thinks it is in his interest to do so
despite the pressures created by a pending investigation or
prosecution, and regardless of whether the suspect has correctly
assessed his own interests.144 Of course, one could simply announce that as a prophylactic matter, the Miranda right to counsel cannot be waived during custodial interrogation, but such a
rule would be quite a radical innovation in the law of waiver.145

gation techniques under a regime of searching but ad hoc judicial review.
142 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
143 Irene and Yale Rosenberg, for example, argue that even a counseled waiver is necessarily infected by the pressures of custodial interrogation. See Rosenberg & Rosenberg,
supra note 36, at 107–14. Professor Kamisar argues that the required warnings ought to
be given by or in the presence of a judicial officer. See KAMISAR, supra note 34.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 74–102. To be fair, Charles Ogletree has
maked an attempt along these lines. Writing before the Supreme Court established that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can be waived extrajudicially in Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292–93 (1988), he acknowledged that the right to counsel can be validly waived before a judicial officer, but argued that “[a] suspect does not have the same
degree of protection in the stationhouse when the warnings are given by a police officer
intent on interrogating the suspect . . . .” Ogletree, supra note 33, at 1844 n.97. We have
seen, however, that the test for waiver asks only if the defendant knows he has a right to
counsel and intentionally surrenders it; waiver law has never asked whether the defendant knows enough about the value of counsel to correctly assess his own interests. See,
e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87–92 (2004). And, as we have also seen, the Miranda
warnings ensure that the suspect knows that he has a right to have counsel present during questioning. Thus, the structure of waiver law seems far more consistent with Patterson than with Professor Ogletree’s position, and the propriety of extrajudicial waivers of
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel recognized in Miranda should follow a fortiori from
Patterson.
145 An additional objection can be made to the proposal that is sometimes advanced
that would conjoin judicially supervised interrogation, whether in counsel’s presence or
not, with a warning that the suspect’s refusal to answer questions could be used as evidence of his guilt at trial. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 49, at 70–88; KAMISAR, supra note
34, at 84, 93–94; Alschuler, supra note 51, at 2667–72; see also Russell D. Covey, Interrogation Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1904–09, 1926–32 (2005) (advocating for
compulsory police interrogation authorized by a warrant). These proposals, however, do
not properly accommodate the text of the Fifth Amendment. A guilty defendant subject to
such a procedure, for example, has no choice but to incriminate himself, either by confessing, providing an exculpatory account that could later be disproved and therefore used as
an incriminating false statement of exculpation (as in Bram), or remaining silent, which
would itself be treated as evidence of guilt. It appears that compulsory pretrial examination of an accused was common in most states at the time of the framing, but there is little evidence of any prevalent legal understanding that squared this practice with the text
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Perhaps doctrinal innovation would be appropriate based on
a sufficient showing that the current approach has led to widespread abuse. Abuse, however, cannot be defined as evidence
that police succeed in obtaining waivers in a substantial majority
of cases. As we have seen, nothing in the Fifth Amendment forbids a waiver of the right to be free from compelled selfincrimination. A showing that current waiver law failed to prevent what must be compelled or involuntary confessions, however, might well justify doctrinal reform. Such a case for innovation, however, is necessarily an empirical one, and only a few of
the Miranda critics attempt to make it.146
One Miranda critic who did take up this cudgel was Professor White. Based on a review of confessions in cases in which the
suspect was ultimately exonerated, he argued for a prohibition on
techniques that have produced significant numbers of false confessions: lengthy interrogations, interrogation of vulnerable suspects such as minors or the mentally disabled, and interrogations
involving threats, deception or promises.147 Similarly, Professor
Leo has used empirical evidence of false confessions to support
his proposal that confessions must be corroborated by independent evidence to guard against what he regards as an unacceptable risk of a false confession.148 This approach, like a flat ban on
of the Fifth Amendment. See Moglen, supra note 52, at 1123–29. In any event, the practices of the states at the time of the framing are of little relevance since the Fifth
Amendment was not made applicable to the states until Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964). Rather than basing his argument on an originalist understanding of the Fifth
Amendment, Professor Alschuler asserts that “[a] suspect’s answers to orderly questioning in a safeguarded courtroom environment should not be regarded as the product of
compulsion,” Alschuler, supra note 51, at 2670, but it is difficult to take this argument
seriously. Under such a system, a suspect would be compelled to attend the judicial interrogation under threat of sanction. That is compulsion no less than is requiring a suspect
to take an oath under threat of contempt. As we have seen, the threat of criminal sanctions if a suspect does not submit to interrogation is the proper place to draw the line between persuasion and compulsion. And while this objection is particularly acute for suspects who are in fact guilty, the text of the Fifth Amendment does not limit its protections
to the innocent.
146 This is not to say that the critics have been completely unable to find empirical
evidence of interrogation techniques inconsistent with Miranda. For example, there is
anecdotal evidence that police sometimes tell suspects that the only way they can learn
about the charges against them or obtain some form of leniency is to waive their Miranda
rights. Leo & White, supra note 45, at 440. This evidence shows a misdescription of the
suspect’s rights and the consequences of invoking them given a suspect’s right to notice of
charges and his ability to engage in plea bargaining even after asserting his Miranda
rights. Accordingly, under traditional waiver principles, these tactics will fail to produce
valid waivers because they mislead the suspect about the nature of his rights and the consequences of invoking them. Indeed, under current law, confessions obtained through
misrepresentations of this type are usually suppressed. Marcus, supra note 140, at 615–
18.
147 WHITE, supra note 30, at 196–215. See also, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 32, at 971–
74 (false statements about the evidence against the suspect); Gohara, supra note 35, at
834–40 (deception); Young, supra note 35, at 456–75 (same).
148 Leo et al., supra note 31, at 512–19, 525–35.
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custodial interrogation, is unquestionably prophylactic. Professor White, for example, never argued that lengthy interrogations,
interrogation of vulnerable suspects, or interrogations involving
threats and deception always produce involuntary or unreliable
confessions; instead, his claim was that the risk of an involuntary, unreliable, or otherwise suspect confession is so high in
such circumstances that confessions obtained through these tactics should be barred from evidence by the Due Process Clause.149
Similarly, although the Leo proposal is vague about the doctrinal
basis for its approach, it, too, is rooted in concerns about the supposed prevalence of unreliable confessions, and appears to be
premised on the Due Process Clause.150
The Due Process Clause is indeed the best doctrinal support
for these proposals. Suspects who have waived their Miranda
rights have already made a decision to subject themselves to
compelled self-incrimination by agreeing to answer the questions
of their captors, and in any event, the advocates of these reforms
do not claim that the confessions that they would exclude necessarily involve compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.151 To be sure, Bram supplies at least some support
for using the Fifth Amendment to regulate threats or promises;
in Bram, the Court wrote that “a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of
any improper influence.”152 This passage, however, did not consider whether an admissible confession might result if a confession is preceded by a knowing and intelligent waiver of Fifth
WHITE, supra note 30, at 196–215; White, supra note 139, at 2042–58.
See Leo et al., supra note 31, at 493–522; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 34, at 1115–22.
For present purposes, I put aside the question whether some suspects, because of
their age or mental condition, should be deemed incapable of validly waiving their
Miranda rights. There will undoubtedly be circumstances in which youth or mental disability might prevent an individual from supplying a valid waiver, but there will also be
many circumstances in which minors or those under a mental disability will be able to
make a deliberate and voluntary choice to waive their Miranda rights, which is all that
standard waiver doctrine requires. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169–70
(1986) (holding that voluntariness of a waiver “has always depended on the absence of
police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’ in any broader sense of the word”). It is worth
noting, however, that one recent study concluded that the ability of juveniles older than
fifteen to understand their Miranda rights while under interrogation was on par with
that of adults. Feld, supra note 108, at 90–92. The author warned, however, that juveniles may be more vulnerable to police influence. Id. at 98–100. Another recent study
provides far greater reason to doubt that mentally retarded subjects are capable of giving
valid waivers. See Morgan Cloud et al., Words without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495 (2002).
152 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897) (quoting SIR WM. OLDNALL
RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 478 (Horace Smith & A.P. Perceval
Keep eds., 6th ed. 1896)). See also Hirsch, supra note 35, at 54–59.
149
150
151
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Amendment rights. Moreover, the Court has more recently
stated that “this passage [in] Bram . . . does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confession.”153 The
Court was correct; as we have seen, under settled principles of
waiver, the fact that a suspect is facing the threat of enhanced
sanctions if he asserts his constitutional rights does not invalidate a waiver of those rights, as long as the suspect understands
his rights and elects to surrender them in the hope of some reciprocal advantage.154
Thus, we are left with the Due Process Clause as the basis
for additional judicial regulation of interrogation. Assessing the
case for due process regulation, however, involves a necessarily
empirical inquiry. Suppose, for example, that the type of threat
that is condoned by the plea bargaining cases—the threat to take
the suspect to trial on the most serious possible charges and then
seek the harshest possible sentence—was likely to produce only
accurate confessions because only guilty suspects were likely to
yield to such a threat.155 Or suppose that the type of deception
condoned by Frazier v. Cupp—false claims that the authorities
have highly incriminating evidence against the suspect—was
also likely to produce reliable confessions because only the guilty
were likely to yield to such claims.156 As it happens, there is
some empirical evidence that pressure or deception is useful to
obtaining confessions, and is more likely to produce truthful than
false confessions.157 It is surely difficult to construct an arguArizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991).
See supra text accompanying notes 74–102.
The defenders of plea bargaining often take essentially this view of the plea bargaining process, which, we have seen, also involves threats of punishment as a means to
garner waivers of constitutional rights. See generally, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992); Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea
Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599 (2005); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992).
156 Some courts have condoned such deception because they believe that suspects who
are confident of their innocence will not be influenced by this form of deception. See, e.g.,
State v. Kelekolio, 849 P.2d 58, 71–74 (Haw. 1993); Sheriff, Washoe County v. Bessey, 914
P.2d 618 (Nev. 1996).
157 See Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEXAS TECH, L. REV. 1275,
1280–84 (2007). One particularly striking study involved interrogation of participants
about whether they had improperly received assistance during a decision making exercise, utilizing for some participants a interrogation tactic involving an offer of leniency if
they confessed and, for others, the use of tactics designed to minimize the seriousness of
the offense, The study indicated that these pressure tactics, at least when used separately, increased the rate of true confessions far more than the rate of false confessions
153
154
155

Condition
No Tactic
Deal
Minimization
Minimization + Deal

True Confessions

False Confessions

46%
72%
81%
87%

6%
14%
18%
43%
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ment that due process forbids interrogation techniques that are
likely to produce accurate confessions by suspects who have
knowingly and intelligently agreed to submit to interrogation despite an awareness of their Miranda rights—indeed, the advocates of additional due process regulation do not make such an
argument.158 To be sure, some commentators are troubled by any
form of official deception,159 but adopting that view would mark a
radical change in our constitutional tradition which, for example,
has long tolerated police undercover work despite the necessary
deceit that it usually entails.160 Moreover, it is a respectable
moral position to permit official deceit in the interest of a greater
social good, such as the detection or prevention of crime, at least
when there is not an unreasonable likelihood of convicting the
innocent and when those who employ these tactics are subject to
political accountability.161 Thus, for the most part, the advocates
of additional due process regulation of interrogation tactics stake
their position on an empirical claim that these tactics endanger
the innocent.162
The problem with the empirical case for greater due process
regulation, however, is that we have no idea what rate of false
confessions is produced by the tactics that the critics have tar-

Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel ExStill, data assembled
perimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481, 484 Table 1 (2006).
under experimental conditions should be viewed with caution. See supra note 90.
158 I put aside confessions obtained by false promises of leniency or other benefits.
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely decided whether a confession induced by
a promise of leniency must be suppressed if the promise is not honored, it has held that a
guilty plea cannot stand when induced by an unfulfilled promise. See Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–63 (1971). It would seem to follow that a promise that induces a
confession must be honored. See Welsh S. White, Confessions Induced by Broken Government Promises, 43 DUKE L.J. 947 (1994). For a review of the pertinent case law, which
makes inadmissibility turn on whether the defendant confessed in reliance on an unfulfilled promise, see Marcus, supra note 140, at 621–24. To be sure, a skillful interrogator
will be able to raise a suspect’s hopes for leniency without making a promise—I did just
that on many occasions.
159 See, e.g., Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR. L. REV. 817 (1997); Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 3 (1995); Young, supra
note 35, at 468–71. Deborah Young, without citing empirical evidence to support her
supposition, adds a utilitarian claim by arguing that police deceit is counterproductive
because it will produce distrust that will ultimately reduce civilian cooperation with the
authorities. See id. at 457–60. Those who claim that the law enforcement community
does not understand where its own interests lie should bear the burden of adducing some
empirical evidence to that effect.
160 See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952); Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420 (1896); Grimm v. United States,
156 U.S. 604 (1895).
161 For an argument along these lines, see Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and
Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775 (1997).
162 See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 30, at 196–215; Alschuler, supra note 32, at 967–78;
Gohara, supra note 35, at 816–34.
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geted. For example, there is no data that provides even a rough
guess about how likely the tactics that Professor White has identified produce false confessions, much less wrongful convictions,163 as Professor White ultimately acknowledged.164 Similarly, Professor Leo’s approach, forbidding what are thought to be
inadequately corroborated confessions, makes no effort to identify an error rate for such confessions.165 It may be that a good
many confessions with no more corroboration than was present
in the Central Park Jogger case, for example, are entirely accurate. Nor have the advocates of the Leo approach explained why
judges are more likely than juries to be able to identify confessions that are likely to be false. No empirical evidence supports
such a claim, and, as we have seen, the judicial track record under the current voluntariness test provides little cause for optimism.
Maybe even more important, we do not even know if the tactics identified by the critics produce disproportionate numbers of
false confessions. Perhaps they do not. When I engaged in interrogation as a prosecutor, for example, I usually engaged in some
degree of puffing about the strength of the case against the suspect—something that might well be branded deception. I also
regularly engaged in what could be characterized as threats—at
least the kind of threat to seek the maximum punishment generally condoned by the plea bargaining cases.166 And, in every multiple confession case that I handled, the suspects initially contradicted each other, placing greater culpability on each other.
Thus, it would not surprise me if the vast majority of custodial interrogations involve the features condemned by critics. If
so, the fact that a study of false confessions will frequently disclose the use of the interrogation tactics identified by Professor
White, or what Professor Leo would regard as insufficiently corroborated confessions, provides no basis to conclude that these
163 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 503–38 (1998); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1168, 1188–97 (2001).
164 See White, supra note 30, at 1224–29. Instead, Professor White argued that the
data suggests that about one-tenth of wrongful convictions involve false confessions in
potentially capital cases, while admitting that the percentage of confession-induced
wrongful convictions is likely lower in non-capital cases. See id. at 1228–29. This tells us
next to nothing about the rate at which the interrogation tactics of which he complains
induce wrongful confessions, and even less about how many truthful confessions would be
lost under the reforms that he advocates.
165 See Leo et al., supra note 31, at 512–20.
166 To be fair, I should acknowledge that as I gained experience, I tended to place
these threats into a type of “I’d really like to help you if you’ll let me” context, not because
I had particular scruples about threats, but because I found that a congenial ambience
made for more effective interrogation.
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features increase the likelihood that a confession is false. At
best, it is probably reasonable to presume that more aggressive
interrogation techniques will produce a higher rate of confessions
than more passive approaches, but it is entirely unclear that the
rate of false confessions will also increase through more aggressive techniques.167
Although the critics make no effort to identify an error rate
for the confessions that they would exclude from evidence, perhaps their surveys of false confession cases justifies an assumption that there is some nontrivial error rate associated with the
interrogation tactics that they target for elimination. But
“[t]here is always in litigation a margin of error . . . .”168 I never
prosecuted an individual about whose guilt I had a reasonable
doubt, but if it surfaced today that some of the convictions I obtained were inaccurate, I would not be shocked. Even under a
reasonable-doubt standard, factfinding is necessarily a probabilistic business, and most kinds of proof inject a risk of error. For
example, the available empirical evidence demonstrates a risk of
error in the use of eyewitness testimony,169 accomplice testimony,170 and even fingerprint evidence.171
In fact, false confessions may not be the leading cause of erroneous convictions. Surveys of documented exonerations consistently find that eyewitness testimony is the leading cause of false
convictions.172 It would seem to follow (once any need to identify
167 To be sure, one can build an anecdotal case that interrogators sometimes persuade
a suspect that his position is so hopeless that he has no realistic choice but to confess, see,
e.g., Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents At
Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 220–22 (2005); Ofshe & Leo, supra note 34, at 1004–
114, but this says nothing about the rate at which the very same tactics induce a guilty
suspect to provide an accurate confession.
168 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
169 See, e.g., BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 10–13 (1995); Gross et al., supra note 31, at
542–44; Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application
of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581 (2000).
170 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to
Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006).
171 See, e.g., Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985 (2005); Simon A. Cole, The Prevalence and Potential Causes of Wrongful Conviction by Fingerprint Evidence, 37 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 39 (2006).
172 See, e.g., Gross et al., supra note 31, at 542–46; Adrian T. Grounds, Understanding
the Effects of Wrongful Imprisonment, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1,
10–11 (Michael Tonry ed., 2005); Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105 MICH. L. REV. 241, 253–56 (2006). This estimate should be viewed
with caution, however, since documented exonerations are not likely to be a random sample of all wrongful convictions, but instead are heavily skewed toward sex crimes and
other types of offenses in which DNA or other conclusive physical evidence can establish
factual innocence, or serious crimes subject to intensive investigation. See, e.g., Gross, et
al., supra note 31, at 529–40.
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an actual error rate has been jettisoned) that if due process mandates regulation of interrogation practices because of the risk of
error, due process must compel restrictions on the use of eyewitness testimony, and other types of evidence or investigative tactics that produce what one could plausibly surmise to be an unacceptable error rate.173 Moreover, even if courts could somehow
divine error rates, how are they to decide what constitutes an
unacceptable risk of error? Three percent? Ten percent? We are
not told, but presumably the critics would require restrictions on
investigative tactics at something well below fifty percent. That
would mean that far more reliable evidence of guilt would be excluded than would false evidence of guilt. And what about the
large numbers of guilty offenders who will go unpunished if
courts brand as impermissible investigative tactics that are far
more likely to produce accurate than false convictions but that
nevertheless produce error rates that are thought to be unacceptable? The Miranda-is-a-failure scholarship evinces no particular concern about this problem, although surely there is reason to believe that conviction rates will be reduced if eyewitness
identifications, accomplice testimony, aggressive interrogation
techniques, or other tactics thought to produce unacceptable error rates are sharply circumscribed, if not prohibited altogether.174
All of this should suggest that due process regulation of interrogation and other investigative techniques based on a presumed risk of error is deeply problematic. Nor is there any ready
answer to the argument that “due process,” in this context, requires something more than deference to the political process.175
173 Due process already requires the exclusion of eyewitness identifications that are
thought to be the product of unduly suggestive identification procedures absent sufficient
indicia of reliability. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109–14 (1977). But since this
rule appears not to have prevented some significant number of false convictions, the logic
of the due process position would seem to be that it must be supplemented by some additional prophylactic safeguards.
174 The risk that reforms will go wrong is far from hypothetical. Although a large majority of experts in the field of identification testimony have relied on laboratory data to
urge that witnesses view potential offenders sequentially rather than in simultaneous
lineups in procedures administered by a “blind” official who does not know who has been
identified as a suspect by investigators, see Dawn McQuiston-Surrett, Roy S. Malpass &
Colin G. Tredoux, Sequential vs. Simultaneous Lineups: A Review of Methods, Data, and
Theory, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 137, 137–38 (2006), the limited empirical data gathered in the field to date shows that the rate at which the suspect is identified goes down
while the rate at which an innocent “filler” is identified goes up. See id. at 161–62. Thus,
it appears that this technique may increase the risk that an innocent suspect will be identified.
175 When it comes to what are considered “legislative” rules applied to large numbers
of cases, the legislative process is ordinarily thought to supply all the process that is constitutionally “due.” See, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 129–30 (1985); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432–33 (1982); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
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It is hard to be unsympathetic to the problem of false convictions,
but for that very reason, it is far from clear that the political
process will fail to respond to the problem, at least when reliable
data becomes available demonstrating how the error rate in the
criminal process can be efficaciously reduced without unacceptable limitations on the ability to convict the guilty.
Due process is not unconcerned with the risk of error in the
criminal justice system. Due process is understood to require the
prosecution to prove a criminal defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for just this reason.176 The advocates of due process
regulation of interrogation (and other investigative) techniques,
however, seek additional protection, based on evidence that these
techniques produce some nontrivial (although as yet unascertained) error rate. As a doctrinal matter, the absence of any historical support for prophylactic due process regulation of interrogation techniques based on a presumed risk of error might itself
doom the case for new regulation.177 Even putting that problem
aside, however, no one could tenably read the Due Process Clause
as a prohibition of error in the criminal justice system. In any
system administered by humans, there will be error. Surely “due
process” accommodates that much reality.
CONCLUSION
The advocates of due process prohibition of interrogation
techniques thought to pose unacceptable risks of error are what
Henry Monaghan once called constitutional “perfectionists.”178
Although he applied the label to the 1970s-vintage movement
among legal scholars to read the Constitution as mandating
whatever they believed to be a more just system of governance,179
the same phenomenon is today perhaps even more prevalent
among scholars of constitutional criminal procedure. Led by Professor Stuntz, they read the Constitution to command whatever
176 See, e.g., Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 39–40 (1990) (per curiam); Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370–72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
177 See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 442–46 (1992). See generally Jerold H.
Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court’s Search
for Interpretative Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001). To be fair, there is at least
a bit of precedent for ahistorical due process regulation in order to reduce the risk of error
in the criminal process. The Court departed from history when, in Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), it held that prosecutors must disclose exculpatory information to the
defense, and subsequently broadened that duty to require prosecutors to identify and disclose exculpatory information in the hands of the police and other investigators, see Kyles
v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995), even though historically prosecutors had never been
placed under any type of duty of disclosure. Michael Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19
HASTINGS L.J. 865, 865–67, 893–99 (1968); see generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS
OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 283–343 (2003).
178 Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 358 (1981).
179 See id. at 355–60.
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they believe to be the optimal system of convicting the guilty and
protecting the innocent.180
The Constitution’s objectives, however, are more modest.
Our Constitution does not contain a “no-conviction-of-theinnocent” clause, presumably not because anyone wants to convict the innocent, but because such an objective is unattainable.
Perhaps the empirical evidence may one day be available that
will enable us to reduce the risk of error in the criminal process
without placing unacceptable constraints on our ability to convict
the guilty. That day, however, has not yet arrived. And, although scholars can occupy the ivory towers of constitutional perfectionism with impunity, those in the trenches of law enforcement are expected to deal with the grimmest of daily realities. In
that world, perfectionism is beyond reach. Getting a valid
Miranda waiver ought to be good enough.

180 Professor Stuntz’s criticism of Miranda, for example, is that it fails to achieve
what he regards as distributive justice by maximizing the number of suspects who submit
to interrogation while minimizing what he regards as abusive questioning. See Stuntz,
supra note 30, at 992–98. It is far from clear how this objective comports with the text of
the Fifth Amendment, but that does not seem to be the point of the exercise.

